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SUMMARY 
The dissertation investigates South Africa’s legal aspects pertaining to voluntary 
repatriation of refugees. The repatriation of Mozambican and Angolan refugees was 
referred to in order to examine the loopholes in the process of repatriating them. This 
study moreover examines whether the application of the cessation clause is in 
contravention of the principle of non-refoulement, which is intrinsically the 
cornerstone for voluntariness of repatriation. The analysis of international, regional 
and South Africa’s refugee protection framework demonstrates that South Africa 
affords refugees the protection required by international law. This has been 
compared with states’ practice and case law with regards to refugee protection in 
countries including Canada and the United Kingdom. Although South Africa, Canada 
and the United Kingdom have comprehensive legal framework governing refugees’ 
protection, refugees’ rights have been violated on numerous occasions. The 
dissertation consequently concludes that notwithstanding the presence of 
international, regional and domestic legislations, the rights of refugees are violated 
due to their vulnerability and the repatriation process ignores the principle of 
voluntariness on several occasions.   
Key terms 
Refugees; Voluntary Repatriation; Cessation; Non-refoulement; South Africa; 
Canada; United Kingdom. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
The movement of people throughout history can be categorised into various 
categories including those related to forced migration. Forced migration is generally 
due to various reasons including famine, droughts, natural disaster and conflicts.1 
The issue of conflict has marked people’s movement who are forced to leave their 
countries out of fear for their lives, safety, and the safety of their families and loved 
ones.2 Since the olden days, war has fundamentally contributed to the movement of 
people who seek refuge in other territories.3  
Both World War I (WW I) and World War II (WW II) exposed the problem of the 
movement of people in particular refugees from the combatant states. The refugees’ 
problem which surfaced after WW I was dealt with according to the norms of the 
League of Nations (LN) which was required to solve the “successive waves of 
refugees.”4 The LN was succeeded by the United Nations.5 The preamble of the 
United Nations (UN)6 Charter provides amongst various other things the promotion of 
“fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women” including refugees from “nations large and small.”7 
                                                          
1 Stenberg Non-Expulsion and Non-Refoulement (1989) 19. 
2 See, the introduction and background of the Zimbabwe Exile Forum and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others [2011] ZAGPPHC 29  [1] 1. (Hereafter “the Zimbabwe Exile Forum 
case”). 
3 Zimmermann The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol (2011)  41. See also Collins  An Analysis of Voluntariness of Refugee Repatriation in 
Africa (1996) 1. See also, Bakewell Refugee Repatriation in Africa: Towards a Theoretical 
Framework? (1996) 16. 
4 Weis P “The Refugee Convention 1951: The Travaux Preparatoires Analysed with a 
commentary” by Dr Paul Weis; http://www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.html (accessed 15 October 
2012). See also, Collins (1996) 20. 
5 Collins (1996) 20. 
6 Hereafter “the UN”. 
7 See, the Preamble of the UN Charter. “The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 
June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on 
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This contributed to the creation of a legal framework which governs, protects and 
solves the problem of refugees. 
The people, who move to other countries evading persecution, conflict, natural 
disasters, etc. in their countries of origin, often require crossing borders of other 
countries. This creates a myriad of social and legal problems including changes in 
the legal regime governing the affairs of these people who become refugees in the 
recipient countries. That is to say, the legal regime of the recipient countries 
becomes the applicable law on these refugees and not the legal regime of the 
countries of their origin.  
Notwithstanding, the international nature of refugees’ problems makes it mandatory 
to have an international approach to domestic refugee problems. This international 
approach has developed legal mechanisms to protect refugees and establish durable 
solutions which include resettlement, integration and repatriation.  
Repatriation can either be voluntary or involuntary as a result of change in the 
circumstances which have initially caused the refugees to escape from their home 
countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)8 considers 
that durable solutions for refugees include resettlement; integration and voluntary 
repatriation. The latter remains the most durable solution.9 The repatriation of 
refugees is therefore the most durable solution when it is executed on the voluntary 
basis signifying the free will of refugees.10 This was also emphasised by the UNHCR 
when it affirmed 1992 as the “Year of Voluntary Repatriation.”11 
However, in many instances refugees are repatriated under conditions which are not 
conducive for sustained return. Consequently, refugees are repatriated without being 
afforded an opportunity to decide whether to return to the country of origin or not, and 
this contradicts the voluntary nature of repatriation. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945. The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice is an integral part of the Charter.” 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/intro.shtml (accessed 26 November 2012). 
8 Hereafter “UNHCR”. 
9 Harrell-Bond “Repatriation: Under What Conditions Is It The Most Desirable Solution For 
Refugees? An Agenda for Research.” 1989 32 African Studies Review 41. 
10 Zieck UNHCR and Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees: A Legal Analysis (1997) 2. 
11 Zieck (1997) 2. 
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Prior to the constitutional dispensation following the democratic elections of 1994, 
South Africa was a refugee producing country with regards to its majority black 
population.12 In the meantime, the apartheid government did not recognise refugees 
in the country. South Africa did not apply the internationally acceptable principles for 
refugee and human rights protection. In one of its effort to keep refugees outside 
South Africa, the apartheid government erected a high voltage fence on its borders.13  
The new constitutional government that came after the 1994 democratic government 
brought the Interim Constitution. The Interim Constitution14 of South Africa 
established compatible normative rules for human rights and refugee protection. The 
Interim Constitution also introduced the Bill of Rights. The position of South Africa 
towards human rights protection was tested in the State v Makwanyane15. This 
landmark constitutional case abolished the death penalty in South Africa because it is 
inhuman, degrading as well as a cruel punishment which is also inconsistent with the 
Interim Constitution.16  
The relevance of the Makwanyane case in respect of refugees is that everyone on 
South African soil enjoys human rights protection irrespective of his/her nationality.17 
Further, the Makwanyane case made reference to the fact that since customary 
international law is law in South Africa, it is therefore imperative to consider 
international instruments dealing with human rights protection. Consequently, the 
legal framework governing refugees in South Africa can be categorised into three 
categories including: 
1. Constitutional norms. 
2. Statutory norms: 
• Refugee Act 130 of 1998. 
                                                          
12 Refugee Rights Project Sustained Advocacy for Empowered Refugees: Rights Manual 
(2004) 10. 
13 Human Rights Watch Prohibited Persons: Abuse of Undocumented Migrants, Asylum 
Seekers, and Refugees in South Africa (1998) 29. 
14 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (hereafter “Interim 
Constitution”). The Interim Constitution of 1993 was the outcome of the multiparty discussion. 
15 State v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) [7] at 3-4 (hereafter “the Makwanyane 
case”).   
16 Makwanyane case  [151] 94-95. 
17 Ibid. [8] 4. 
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• Immigration Act 13 of 2002. 
• South African Citizenship Amendment Act 17 of 2010. 
• Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
• Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
4 of 2000. 
3. International norms.  
• The 1951 Convention and its 1967 UN Protocols  
• The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa 1969. 
• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948. 
• The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
1966. 
• Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment (CAT) 1984. 
• African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 1981. 
• The European Convention on Human Rights 1950. 
• United Nations Committee on Human Rights. 
• The African Commission on Human Rights and People’s Rights. 
1.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Refugees’ plight is to enter into the country wherein their rights can be protected. 
Their protection in the country of refuge includes the right not to be returned back to 
the country where their lives or dignity will be endangered. When a refugee reaches 
his/her sanctuary, the application for asylum becomes possible. Based upon the 
circumstances a refugee may be recognised as a refugee and consequently granted 
a refugee status. However, a refugee status is not a permanent solution because it 
can be terminated according to certain requirements. One of these requirements is 
due to the changed circumstances in the situation of the country of origin. 
Notwithstanding, refugees are faced with some form of involuntary repatriation in one 
way or another. Some of the methods which are considered involuntary repatriation 
include rejection at the frontier, deportation, expulsion and extradition. In spite of the 
commitments of South Africa to afford refugees with proper protection, it is recorded 
that refugees e.g. from Zimbabwe were repatriated or deported without properly 
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ascertaining their asylum eligibility.18 Non-Governmental Organisations alleged that 
South Africa imposes a higher level criterion for Zimbabwean asylum seekers.19 
South Africa has on several occasions sought to return refugees in contravention of 
the principle of non-refoulement. In the case of Mayongo v Refugee Appeal Board,20 
South Africa sought to repatriate Mr Mayongo to Angola due to the fact that the 
circumstances which led him to flee have come to an end. This was despite Mayongo 
indicating that although there is a change of circumstances in Angola, his life would 
still be in danger should he return to Angola.  
Similar circumstances to that of Mayongo were observed in the case of Van 
Garderen v Refugee Appeal Board and Others,21 where the asylum seeker was 
denied a refugee status due to the change of circumstances in the country of origin.22 
The Mayongo and the Van Garderen cases highlight the issue of cessation of 
refugee status due to changed circumstances in the country of origin, and a situation 
where there are compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refugees 
refusal to return. The crucial question at this stage is who actually decides on 
repatriation. Is it the country of refuge without the consent of the refugee or is 
voluntariness by the refugee a requirement? 
In the case of Mohamed v The President of the Republic of South Africa,23 the South 
African Government extradited Mohamed to the United States of America (USA).24  
Mohamed was to be tried in the USA for an offence where if convicted there was a 
                                                          
18 Goodwin-Gill andand McAdam The Refugee in International Law (2007) 231. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Mayongo v Refugee Appeal Board and Others 2007 JOL 19645 (T) (hereafter “Mayongo 
case”). 
21 Van Garderen v Refugee Appeal Board and Others 2008 (1) SA 232 (T) (hereafter “the Van 
Garderen case”). 
22 The Van Garderen case 4-5. 
23 Mohamed v The President of the Republic of South Africa 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC). (Hereafter 
“the Mohamed case”).   
24 Hereafter “USA”. 
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possibility of the death sentence due to his alleged terrorist attack on the USA 
embassy.25  
The tension between strengthening diplomatic ties and violating the rights of 
refugees or asylum seekers also came under scrutiny in the Zimbabwe Exile Forum 
and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others.26 This involved asylum seekers 
from Zimbabwe who protested at the Chinese embassy in South Africa and were 
therefore detained at the Lindela Repatriation Facility (LRF) pending deportation.27  
The cases cited above indicate that South Africa acted in contravention of the 
principle of non-refoulement by involuntarily repatriating or extraditing refugees or 
asylum seekers. It is therefore imperative to investigate whether South Africa’s 
actions were justified either under the domestic or international law governing the 
protection of refugees. 
Notwithstanding the principle of non-refoulement, South Africa and the UNHCR 
embarked on the organised voluntary repatriation processes concerning refugees 
from Mozambique and Angola. South Africa’s first experience with the “voluntary” 
repatriation of refugees was when the Mozambicans were repatriated in 1994.28 This 
repatriation was not completely successful because no proper study was conducted 
with regards to the refugees’ willingness to return.29 Dolan argues that most 
Mozambican refugees did not wish to repatriate and yet the tripartite agreement was 
entered into by South Africa, Mozambique and the UNHCR to repatriate the 
Mozambicans.30 
                                                          
25  The Mohamed  case. 
26  The Zimbabwe Exile Forum case 4-5. 
27 The Zimbabwe Exile Forum case [5] 3. 
28  Polzer “Adapting to Changing Legal Frameworks: Mozambican Refugees in South Africa” 
(2007) 19 Int’l J.  Refugee L 23. 
29  Dolan “Repatriation from South Africa to Mozambique-undermining durable solutions?” 
(1999) 86. 
30 Ibid. 98. 
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Furthermore, South Africa, Angola and the UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement on 
14 September 2003 for “voluntary repatriation of Angolan” refugees.31 The 1969 OAU 
Convention stresses the “voluntary character” of repatriation, yet, the tripartite was 
signed without consulting the refugees to determine their readiness to be 
repatriated.32 In fact, the only study which was conducted showed that the majority of 
Angolans were not yet willing to return whilst others wished to return later when the 
situation in Angola is stable.33 Once again, the repatriation of the Mozambicans and 
the Angolans seemed to lack voluntariness by refugees before it was implemented.  
South Africa has a model Constitution in the world which guarantees human rights 
protection. South Africa is also a party to several treaties protecting vulnerable 
groups such as refugees. It is with great concern that besides the undertaking by 
South Africa to protect refugees, refugees are still refouled in contravention of 
international instruments which South Africa is party to.  
In the Mohamed case the Constitutional Court emphasised South Africa’s 
international obligation in terms of the international instruments as well as the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.34 
South Africa is not the only country that plays a role in the refugee protection 
communities. Many countries including Canada and the United Kingdom (UK)35 
receive refugees or asylum seekers. One of Canada’s setbacks in refugee protection 
was in 2002 when Canada reached an agreement with the USA to forbid the people 
who entered the USA to enter Canada, but rather to return them to the USA.36 This 
was not received well by the refugee lobbies and it was seen as a violation of the 
principle of the non-refoulement contemplated in the 1951 UN Convention.37 Canada 
                                                          
31  Tripartite Agreement on voluntary repatriation of Angolan refugees between the UNHCR, 
the Government of the Republic of Angola, the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/447e99f50.html. (accessed 5 May 2015).  
32  Handmaker and Ndessomin “Implementing a durable solution for Angolan refugees in 
South Africa” (2013) 137. 
33  Ibid. 147-8. 
34 The Mohamed case [59] 917. 
35  Hereafter “UK”. 
36 Lacroix “Canadian refugee policy and the social construction of the refugee." (2004) vol. 17, 
no. 2 Journal of Refugee Studies 147. 
37 Ibid.  
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has developed a strategy to keep refugees away from its shores by requiring that 
nationals from refugee producing countries must obtain visas before entering 
Canada.38 This is in stark contrast with the protection of refugees because a country 
which is persecuting a person cannot offer that person a visa to move out of the 
country.39 More often than not persecution is committed by the government. This 
then makes it difficult for a refugee who escapes persecution to still get a visa from 
the persecuting regime. 
Canada dealt with the issue of cessation and changed circumstances in the case of 
Suleiman v Canada.40 Suleiman was a Tanzanian national whose refugee application 
was rejected in Canada due to the reason that there was a change of circumstances 
in Tanzania.41 The Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) found that although 
Suleiman suffered past persecution, there is a change of circumstances in 
Tanzania.42 The Suleiman case is similar to the Mayongo case where South Africa 
sought to refoule Mayongo, notwithstanding the court finding that Mayongo suffered 
serious previous persecution. 
The issue of balancing national security against the interest of that of a refugee came 
under the spotlight in the case of Suresh v Canada.43 Suresh was a refugee in 
Canada from Sri Lanka and was declared danger to national security in Canada due 
to allegations that he funded terrorism movements and ought to be deported.44 In the 
case of Suresh the Supreme Court of Canada held that extradition to torture without 
assurance that the death sentence will not be imposed violates article 3 of the CAT. 
Similarly to the South African case of Mohamed, the question is whether Canada’s 
actions were justifiable under domestic and international law? 
Other than South Africa and Canada being a party to the international and regional 
instruments barring refoulement, the UK has at times found itself contravening the 
very same conventions which the UK is party to. In 2002 the UK helped to build a 
fence that was to form a barrier for refugees willing to enter Britain and seek 
                                                          
38 Hathaway The Rights of Refugees under International Law (2005) 293.  
39 Hathaway (2005) 291-2.   
40 Suleiman v Canada 2004 FC 1125 [7]  2. (Hereafter “the Suleiman case”). 
41 Ibid. [7] 2. 
42 Ibid. [7] 2. 
43 Suresh v Canada 2002 SCC 1 [1] 3. (Hereafter “the Suresh case”). 
44 Ibid. [1] 3. 
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asylum.45 The actions of the UK are similar to that of apartheid South Africa when an 
electrified fence was utilised to bar the Mozambican refugees from entering South 
Africa.  
The UK has also deported Zimbabwean asylum seekers without following the due 
processes.46 Visa requirements were also employed to bar Zimbabwean refugees 
into the UK. Regarding visa requirements, if a person manages to get a visa from the 
same country that he/she claims persecution from, it therefore puts his/her refugee 
claim into question.47 The actions of the UK using visa requirements to bar refugees 
are similar to the norms applied by Canada.  
The issue of cessation of refugee status was highlighted in the case of Hoxha v 
Canada.48 Hoxha was tortured and shot at by the soldiers in Yugoslavia.49 He then 
fled to the UK where he applied for asylum and his application was denied due to 
changed circumstances in the country of origin.50 
In the case of the European Roma Rights Center and Others v Immigration Officer 
and Others,51 the issue of non-refoulement was adjudicated upon. This case involved 
the challenge by the European Roma Rights Center of the UK practice of pre-entry 
clearance screening of asylum seekers from the Check Republic of Roma ethnic 
origin.52 
The issue of national security interest in the UK came before the European Court of 
Human Rights (EctHR)53 in the case of Chahal v UK.54 Chahal was detained pending 
                                                          
45 Hathaway (2005) 282. 
46 Ibid. 87. 
47 See, Tony Blair, “Asylum, A Peace and Progress Briefing Paper” 
http://www.peacenadprogress.org/briefings/p%26BriefingAsylum%26Immigration.pdf+Tony+B
lair,+Asylum/ (accessed 24 December 2012). 
48 Hoxha v Canada [2002] EWCA Civ 1403 (Hereafter “the Hoxha case”). 
49 Ibid. [2] 2. 
50 Ibid. 
51 European Roma Rights Center and Others v Immigration Officer and Others 2003 EWCA 
Civ 666 (hereafter “the Roma Center case”). 
52 The Roma Center case [3] 2.  
53 Hereafter “ECtHR”. 
54 Chahal v UK 1997 23 EHHR 413 (hereafter “the Chahal case”). 
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deportation as it was alleged that his presence in the UK was “unconducive to public 
good by reason of national security.”55 Chahal applied for asylum because he feared 
persecution, should he be deported to India.56 
The case of Soering v UK57 resembles the South African Mohamed case because it 
similarly involved extradition where the death sentence on conviction could be 
applied. Soering was detained in the UK pending extradition to the USA while there 
was a risk that Soering would be subjected to the death penalty upon being 
extradited to the USA.58 Soering made an application against his deportation.  The 
assurance by the USA that the death sentence will not be carried out was 
unsatisfactory.59  
Challenges experienced by refugees are usually not borne for lack of rules applicable 
to them. The problems that leave refugees exposed to abuse are borne out of 
incorrect application of such rules. The above mentioned countries, South Africa, 
Canada and the UK indicate that regardless of the availability of an international legal 
framework for refugee protection, the wrongful application of these frameworks 
remains a huge concern. 
The UN has developed legal frameworks for the protection of refugees where the 
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,60 and its 1967 
Protocol are central to the normative rules protecting refugees. The United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA)61 Resolution 2312 (XXII) of 1967 relating to the 
                                                          
55 Chahal v UK 1997 23 EHHR 413 [25] 7. 
56 The Chahal case [26] 7. 
57 Soering v. UK 1989 11 EHRR 439  [16] 5 (hereafter “the Soering case”). 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. [22] 7. 
60 The Convention was approved at a special UN Conference on 28 July 1951 and entered 
into force on 22 April 1954. (hereafter “the 1951 UN Convention”) 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html (accessed 26 November 2012). 
61 Hereafter “UNGA”. 
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Declaration on Territorial Asylum also provides for rules towards the protection of 
refugees.62  
Some of the most relevant provisions towards the protection of refugees under the 
1951 UN Convention include the definition of a refugee, the principle of non-
refoulement, an exception to the principle of non-refoulement, and the cessation 
clause.63 The principle of non-refoulement is therefore the building block of the 
refugee protection and strengthens the principle of voluntary repatriation.64 
African states have also developed legal frameworks which govern the refugee 
problems in Africa. The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity of 1969,65  became 
a central legal instrument which offers legal guidelines for the protection of 
refugees.66  In addition to the provisions of the 1951 UN Convention, the 1969 OAU 
Convention provides for an expanded definition of a refugee and voluntary 
repatriation clause. 
The 1969 OAU Convention was commended as the instrument which offers the best 
solution for African refugee problems.67 It was furthermore commended as the first 
international refugee instrument to codify the principle of voluntary repatriation.68 The 
1969 OAU Refugee Convention, conversely, did not manage to solve all the refugee 
problems including voluntariness of repatriation programmes.69 The example of 
involuntary repatriation is but one concern which frequently faces the African 
                                                          
62 See, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2312 (XXII) of 1967 relating to the 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, Article 3. http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/v4dta.htm 
(accessed 30 January 2013). 
63 See articles 1, 33.1, 33.2 and 1.C.5 and 1.C.6 of the 1951 UN Convention. 
64 Beyani C “The Role of Human Rights Bodies in Protecting Refugees” in Bayeski A F (ed) 
Human Rights and Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Migrant Workers: Essays in 
Memory of Joan Fitzpatrick and Arthur Helton (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Netherlands 2006) 
1. 
65 Hereafter  “the 1969 OAU Convention”. 
66 The 1969 OAU Convention. 
67 Okoth-Obbo “Thirty years on: a legal review of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention” (2000) 
Afr. Y.B. Int’l L 2. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid  2. 
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continent. It subsequently, remains one of the major challenges relating to the 
difficulties and complications of refugees. 
The cessation clause provides for the cessation of refugee status once its 
requirements are met.70 These requirements entitle the host country to repatriate the 
refugees without their consent.71 In stark contrast, the UNHCR only promotes the 
repatriation that is “voluntary” instead of mandatory repatriation under the cessation 
clause.72 The  concern and question is, which provisions are applicable to voluntary 
repatriation since the 1951 UN Convention, which is the only binding international 
refugee instrument, does not provide for voluntary repatriation.   
After the fall of the apartheid government, the South African democratic government 
has joined the international community efforts towards the protection of refugees. In 
1996, South Africa ratified both the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU 
Convention.73 In 1998, South Africa passed the Refugee Act 130 of 1998,74 which 
puts international obligation into effect within the domestic sphere of South Africa.75 
The Refugee Act incorporated the provisions of the 1951 UN Convention and the 
1969 OAU Convention within the domestic sphere. 
Other relevant instruments which are applicable towards the protection of refugees 
accepted by South Africa include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR),76 the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),77 the International 
                                                          
70 Hathaway (2005) 929. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid.  
73 Handmaker (2008) 143. 
74 Hereafter “the Refugee Act”. 
75 Handmaker and Ndessomin “Solucão Durável? Implementing a Durable Solution for 
Angolan Refugees in South Africa” (2008) at 143. 
76 Hereafter “the UDHR”. 
77 Hereafter “the ECHR”. 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),78 as well as the Convention Against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT).79   
Canada has additionally made an undertaking to provide protection for refugees. This 
undertaking has been done by becoming a party to the 1951 UN Convention and its 
1967 Protocol.80 Before 1976 Canada had no refugee policy in place and its refugee 
determination was done on an ad-hoc basis.81 In 1978 an Immigration Act came into 
being and it was not long before Canada’s respectable refugee service was 
recognised.82 Since its inception, Canada is known for its sterling work on the 
protection of refugees and consequently received recognition in 1986, being awarded 
the Nansen Medal.83 
Canada then incorporated the refugee definition as provided by the 1951 UN 
Convention into the 1976 Immigration Act, as well as the 2001 Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)84 as amended by Protecting Canada’s Immigration 
System Act (Bill C-31) of 2012.85 Canada ratified the ICCPR in 1976 as well as the 
CAT in 1987.86 The IRPA incorporates not only the 1951 UN Convention but its 1967 
UN Protocol, the CAT as well as the ICCPR.87 The incorporation of these instruments 
                                                          
78 Hereafter “the ICCPR”. 
79 Odhiambo-Abuya  and Nyaoro "Victims of Armed Conflict and Persecution in South Africa: 
Between a Rock and the Hard Place" (2009) Hastings Int’l and Comp. L  24.  See also, Olivier 
"The New Asylum Law in South Africa" (2002) J. S. Afr at 652-3. 
80 Dauvergne “International Human Rights Law in Canadian Immigration Laws -The Case of 
the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada” (2012) Ind. J. Global Legal Stud at 305. 
81 Lacroix (2004) J. Refugee Stud  147.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid.   
84 Hereafter “the IRPA”. 
85 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) 43. Macklin “A safe country to emulate? Canada and 
European refugee” (2013) 100, 117. 
86 The Suresh case [66] 41. 
87 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) at 43. Galloway “Criminality and State Protection: 
Structural Tension in Canadian Refugee Law” (2003) 114. See also, McAdam 
Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (2007) 129. 
14 
 
into Canada’s domestic legislation implies that Canada cannot refoule refugees to 
face persecution.88 
Congruently to South Africa and Canada, the United Kingdom89 is one of the 
countries with its own fair share of refugee challenges. The ECHR and the 1951 UN 
Convention constitute the major legal framework for refugees in the UK because the 
UK is a party to both Conventions.90 In order to give effect to these international and 
regional conventions, the UK has enacted domestic laws to give effect to both the 
above Conventions within the UK’s domestic sphere. The ECHR was incorporated 
into the UK Human Rights Act 1998 which came into force in 2000.91  
The UK Courts confirmed that no UK law should be enacted in order to be in violation 
of the 1951 UN Convention.92 The British Courts and the Constitution do not provide 
sufficient input concerning the asylum procedures.93 This provided that the current 
loophole is supplemented by the British being bound by the ECHR.94 
1.2.1 SAFE RETURN 
Safety is one of the main reasons why people run away from their country to seek 
refuge in a foreign country. Hence, safety is still the most important factor in the 
determination of safe passage back to the country of origin. The most important 
                                                          
88 Sante “Central American Refugees: a consequence of war and social upheaval” (1989)   
102. 
89 United Kingdom (hereafter “the UK”). 
90 See, Tony Blair, “Asylum, A Peace and Progress Briefing Paper” (2005) 1. 
http://www.peacenadprogress.org/briefings/p%26BriefingAsylum%26Immigration.pdf+Tony+B
lair,+Asylum/ (accessed 24 December 2012).  
91British Institute of Human Rights Your Human Rights-A guide for Refugees and asylum 
seekers (2006) 7. See also, O ’Sullivan “The Intersection between the International, the 
Regional and the Domestic: Seeking Asylum in the UK” (2009) 229, 240. 
92 Zimmermann (2011) 41.  
93 Cerna  and Wietholtz  “The case of the United Kingdom” (2011) 199.  
94 Ibid.  
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principle governing voluntary return is that repatriation must be carried out “in safety 
and with dignity.”95 
Although international law does not support torture and abuse of human rights, the 
legal framework ensuring the safe return of refugees is insufficient.96 Another “central 
issue” in the matter of voluntary return and a state’s mandatory return is who actually 
decides?97 Does it mean that once the return can be carried out in safety and dignity, 
then the refugee does not have a choice except to return to the country of origin? 
Although the protection of refugees is of paramount importance, the application of 
repatriation rules seems to indicate that repatriation takes preference over 
protection.98 
1.2.2 VOLUNTARINESS 
Voluntariness touches at the core of the legal aspect for voluntary repatriation of 
refugees. The concept of voluntariness of repatriation is not provided by the 1951 UN 
Convention, it is therefore only provided by the UNHCR Statute.99 The 1951 UN 
Convention simply provides for “safe return”.100 The 1951 UN Convention therefore 
encourages host countries to implement the cessation clause objectively without 
considering the subjective concerns of refugees.101  
The conflict between voluntary repatriation and safe return has been argued by B.S. 
Chimni as follows: 
“It is my view that to replace the principle of voluntary repatriation by 
safe return, and to substitute the judgment of States and institutions for 
                                                          
95 Cwik “Forced to Flee and to Repatriate? How the Cessation Clause of Article 1C (5) and (6) 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention Operates in International Law and Practice” (2011) Vand. J. 
Transnat’l Law 711.  
96 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) 497. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Takahashi “The UNHCR Handbook on voluntary repatriation: the emphasis of return over 
protection” (1997) Int’l J. Refugee L 593. 
99 Chimni From resettlement to involuntary repatriation: Towards a critical history of durable 
solution to refugee problem (1999) 1. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
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that of the refugees, is to create space for repatriation under duress, 
and may be tantamount to violating the principle of non-
refoulement.”102 
Hathaway argues that although the UNHCR Statute provides for voluntariness of 
repatriation, this provision does not do away with the powers conferred upon states 
under the cessation clause in terms of the 1951 UN Convention.103  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the following aspects concerning 
refugee protection in South Africa: 
• What does the South African Legal Framework governing the protection of 
refugees and the influence of the international refugee and human rights law 
entail?  
• The South African Legal Framework with specific reference to voluntary 
repatriation and its application in refugee protection poses another question; 
the notion of safe return versus voluntary repatriation. Which framework is 
applicable? 
• The research also investigates whether the application of the cessation 
clause by South Africa is in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement; 
the cornerstone for refugee protection.  
• What is the effect of extradition, expulsion and deportation on the principle of 
non-refoulement. 
• Do the refugee and human rights legislations apply concurrently to offer 
adequate refugee protection? 
1.4 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research will be based on organised voluntary repatriation which takes place 
with the involvement of the government concerned as well as the UNHCR, and not 
referring to the spontaneous refugees where refugees return without the direct 
involvement of the governments and the UNHCR concerned. The focus will be on the 
                                                          
102 Chimni “The Meaning of Words and the Role of UNHCR in Voluntary Repatriation” (1993) 
Int’l J. Refugee L 454. 
103 Hathaway “The Meaning of Repatriation” (1997) 9 Int’l J. Refugee 553. 
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refugee repatriation after the new constitutional dispensation in South Africa. The 
study will exclusively focus on voluntary repatriation and not on resettlement and 
integration. The study will furthermore analyse voluntary repatriation simultaneously 
with the principle of non-refoulement. The principle of non-refoulement will 
encompass actions such as rejection at the frontier, expulsion, deportation and 
extradition. 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE 
Firstly, this signifies to the understanding of the South African legal aspects for 
voluntary repatriation of refugees. Secondly, this is to endeavor to emphasise the 
point of interest for further research on specifically, areas of inadequate refugee 
protection. 
1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The South African legal framework governing the protection of refugees rests on the 
international refugee laws, regional refugee laws, as well as human rights laws. The 
1951 UN Convention and its 1967 UN Protocol are the primary sources of the 
international refugee protection regime. 
Other than international conventions governing refugee protection, regional 
instruments moreover contributed to the development of refugee law in South Africa. 
Regional instruments which are part and parcel of South Africa’s refugee regime 
include the 1969 OAU Convention and the ECHR. 
The South African legal framework for the protection of refugees is also intertwined 
with the human rights law which includes among other things the UDHR, ICCPR, 
CAT, and ACPHR. 
The analysis of South African case law on refugees suggests that state practice is 
often not compliant with the international refugee protection instruments. This was 
evident in the Mohamed case, the Mayongo case, and the Van Garderen case. Case 
law on refugees in other countries such as Canada and the UK also suggests the 
contravention of international instruments which protects refugees. Case law 
indicates that violation of refugees’ rights occurs irrespective of the international 
instruments barring violation of refugees’ rights. 
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There are more studies completed by different scholars internationally regarding the 
principle of voluntary repatriation which is also relevant to South Africa. Goodwin-Gill 
is one of the leading international scholars who wrote extensively on the issue of 
voluntary repatriation. Goodman-Gill and McAdam argue that the core element of 
voluntary return is voluntary choice by the refugee.104 The same argument is 
advanced by writers such as Chimni,105  Morjoleine Zieck,106 and Cwik107. 
Hathaway108 cautions however, that the reference to voluntariness of repatriation by 
the UNHCR does not get rid of powers conferred upon the state to return refugees 
without their consent, with the implication that safeguards their protection. Hathaway 
argues that repatriation in terms of the 1951 UN Convention does not require 
voluntariness by the refugee, and once its requirements are met, the refugee should 
repatriate. 
Handmaker and Dosso Ndessamin109 argue that the Angolan repatriation from South 
Africa was not voluntary as refugees were not yet ready to return to Angola. 
Nonetheless, the tripartite agreement to repatriate was entered into by South Africa, 
Angola, and the UNHCR. The argument is furthered that the Angolans were not 
given alternatives or choices in the repatriation matter.110  
Similar sentiments were argued by Dolan in that the Mozambican refugees did not 
wish to repatriate and yet the tripartite agreements were entered into by the 
governments concerned, and the UNHCR.111 The UNHCR also terminated the 
provision of food parcels to Mozambican refugees in South Africa, in so doing 
                                                          
104 Goodman Gill and McAdam (2007) 494. 
105 Refer to Chimni (1999). 
106 Zieck (1997) 2. 
107 Cwik (2011) 711. 
108 Hathaway (1997) 9 Int’l J. Refugee 553. 
109 Handmaker and Dosso Ndessomin (2013) 147-8. 
110 Ibid. 144. 
111 Dolan (1999) 98. 
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inducing refugees to return.112 South Africa deported about 310 000 Mozambican 
refugees in 1993-1996.113 
The ECtHR and the HRC adjudicate on cases of human rights violation. This 
implicates that the human rights law can operate alongside refugee law to offer 
comprehensive refugee protection. The South African case of Makwanyane also 
emphasised that everyone including refugees enjoys human rights protection in 
South Africa.114 
This research is aimed at supplementing the existing scholars’ arguments and to 
establish why the state practices suggest the infringement of the principle of 
voluntariness of repatriation, regardless of the availability of the legal framework of 
non-refoulement. 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.7.1 DESIGN 
This is a descriptive research whereby the South African legal framework for 
voluntary repatriation will be investigated. The point of departure will be to examine 
the international and regional legal framework for refugees and human rights 
protection, the legislative framework for all countries involved in this study, 
particularly South Africa, Canada, and the United Kingdom.  
The principle of voluntary repatriation and the most relevant legislative framework will 
be explored and followed by the state practice with regards to the voluntary 
repatriation of refugees. Writings and research by experts on the inquiry will also be 
undertaken and their diverse views are analysed and compared. 
1.7.2 RESEARCH METHODS 
The research will mainly be conducted through a literature review of books, journals, 
articles, legislations and case law. Comparative methods will be applied in this 
research. 
                                                          
112 Kent “Evaluating the Palestinians’ Claimed Right to Return” (2012-2013) U. Pa. J. Int’l L 
233. 
113 Ibid. 257. 
114 The Makwanyane [7] 3-4.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 
2.1 BACKGROUND  
The development of refugee law regime has been influenced by earlier refugee 
regimes such as the international aliens law, as well as the League of Nations.115 
These earlier regimes have led to the proliferation of other regimes to protect 
refugees and human rights. International human rights law offers international human 
rights protection where such rights cannot be offered by the country of nationality.116 
In the same context international humanitarian law is relevant to refugees because it 
offers effective protection and humanitarian assistance to refugees.117  
However, states, academics as well as institutions are still reluctant to view these 
branches of law as interrelated.118 In 2006, the General Assembly encouraged states 
to offer protection which is in line with the UDHR, the ICCPR, as well as the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.119 
In an effort to solve the continuing challenges facing human kind, including refugees 
as a result of WW I and II, the United Nations Charter (UNC)120 was adopted on 26 
June 1945.121 The UNC’s approach to the protection of human rights is evident in its 
preamble by making reference to “we the people” and not “we the states”.122 The 
preamble of the UNC provides that: 
                                                          
115 Hathaway (2005) 75-83. 
116 Canada v Ward 1993 2 RCS 2 [c] 691 (hereafter “the Ward case”), Pushpanathan v 
Canada 1998 SCR 1 [56] 1022-3 (hereafter “the Pushpanathan case”). McAdam J “The 
Refugee Convention as A Rights Blueprint for Persons in Need of International Protection” 
(2008) 267.  
117 Hathaway (2005) 119-20. 
118 McAdam (2008) 264. 
119 Goodwin-Gill G S “Forced Migration: Refugees, The Refugee, Refugees, Rights and 
Security” (2008) 13. 
120 Hereafter “the UNC”. 
121 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945. 
122 De Wet E and Vidmar J Hierarchy in international law (2012) 16. 
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“We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in equal 
rights of men and women …” 
The reference to “we the people” and not “we the states” was an endeavor to elevate 
the protection of human rights above that of the states.123  
Another milestone in the development of the international refugee regime was the 
adoption of the UDHR.124 These developments led to the UN proposing the 
international protection of stateless persons and refugees.125 This ultimately then led 
to the establishment of the UNHCR and the 1951 UN Convention.126 The 1951 UN 
Convention was later modified by the 1967 Protocol.  
This chapter therefore deals with the international legal framework, that is, the 
international refugee law as well as international human rights law which shaped the 
South African constitutional and statutory norms for the protection of refugees. 
Since South Africa became a democratic state, it has moved away from global 
isolation into the global community. The South African legal framework governing 
refugees has been influenced by this global community and can be categorised into 
three categories i.e. international norms, constitutional norms and statutory norms. 
2.2 THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
The UDHR was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly Resolution 217 A 
(III) of 10 December 1948.127 It became the first non-binding instrument to introduce 
the concept of the right to asylum.128 In its preamble, the UDHR provides for the 
                                                          
123 Ibid. 
124 Zieck (1997) 23. 
125 Hathaway  (2005)  91. See also Collins (1996)  20. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Goodwin-Gill “Forced Migration: Refugees, Rights and Security” (2008) 3.  
128 D’Orsi “The AU Convention on Refugees and the concept of asylum” (2012) 3 Pace Int’l L. 
Rev 226. Sharpe "The 1969 African Refugee Convention: Innovations, Misconceptions and 
Omissions" (2012-2013) McGill Law Journal 103. Hathaway (2005) 119. 
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protection of human rights, “in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the 
equal rights of men and women”.129 The UDHR subsists as the principal human 
rights protection instruments and most of its provisions have also been recognised by 
some as having reached the level of customary international law.130 
Article 5 of the UDHR131 provides that “no one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Article 14(1) of the same 
declaration,132 tackles the right to asylum as follows: “everyone has the right to seek 
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” 
The right to seek and enjoy asylum as provided by the UDHR does not impose the 
legal obligation on states to grant asylum.133 This is due to the fact that the UDHR 
does not have a binding effect on states parties.134 The right to asylum in the UDHR 
reflects “more accurately the right of the state to grant asylum rather than the state’s 
duty to honor an individual’s request for asylum”.135 
The UDHR also provides for the right to leave and return to one’s country and this 
right is linked to the principle of voluntary repatriation.136 Article 13(2) of the UDHR 
provides that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to 
return to his country.” 
                                                          
129 See, the preamble of the UDHR. 
130 Kidane “Managing Forced Displacement by Law in Africa: The Role of the New African 
Union IDP’s Convention” (2011) 44. Vand. J. Transnat’l L 7 fn 13. D’Orsi Specific 
Characteristics and Challenges of Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Protection in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Lesson Learnt in Search of a Better Future (2013) 3. 
131 The UDHR. 
132 The UDHR. See also, Zieck (1997) 26. 
133 Naldi and D’Orsi “The Multi-faceted Aspects of Asylum-Law Applicable to Africa: Analysis 
for Reflection” (2014) 3 Loy. L.A.  Int’l and Comp. L. Rev 122.  
134 Ibid. 
135 Bledsoe and Boczek The International Law Dictionary 89 as quoted in Naldi G J and 
D’Orsi (2014) 3 Loy. L.A.  Int’l and Comp. L. Rev fn 36. 
136 D’Orsi (2013) 409. 
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2.3 THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
REFUGEES  
The UNHCR is a humanitarian organisation which was established on 14 December 
1950 by the UN General Assembly Resolution 428 (V) and therefore became the 
leading agency in providing assistance and protection to refugees.137 The UNHCR 
has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on two occasions, in 1954 and in 1981, for 
its sterling work on refugees.138  
The UNHCR replaced the International Refugee Organisation.139 It became the 
agency which provides “international protection” and seeks “permanent solutions for 
the problem of refugees”.140 The UNHCR Statute provides protection for refugees as 
provided by earlier treaties as well as those refugees as a result of “events occurring 
before 1 January 1951”.141 The UNHCR moreover assists in the supervision and 
implementation of the refugee protection instruments.142  
2.3.1 THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSIONER 
The UNHCR Statute provides for functions and responsibilities of the Commissioner 
as well as the definition of persons of interest to the UNHCR.143 The role of the 
Commissioner is mainly focused on the protection of refugees by finding permanent 
solutions to the plight of refugees including their repatriation, integration and 
resettlement.144 Integration of refugees can be a twofold approach, either it is locally 
in the country of refuge or it is in the country of origin after return.145 
                                                          
137 Venzke How interpretation makes international law: on semantic change and normative 
twist (2012) 87. See also, Van Selm, Kamanga, Morrison, Nadig, Špoljar-Vržina and Van 
Willegen The Refugee Convention at Fifty, A view from forced migration studies (2003)  12. 
UNHCR Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee law (2001) 21. 
138 Venzke (2012)  88. 
139 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) 20.  
140 D’Orsi (2013) 11. See also, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) 20. 
141 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007)  21. 
142 Wouters (2009) 39. 
143 UNHCR (2001) 22. D’Orsi (2013) 343. 
144 Chapter 1 (1) of the UNHCR Statute. See also, D’Orsi (2013) 343. 
145 D’Orsi (2013) 345. 
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The UNHCR Statute on voluntary repatriation provides that the High Commissioner 
shall provide for the protection of refugees falling under the competence of his Office 
by assisting governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation or the 
assimilation within new national communities.146 
The general provisions in Chapter 1 of the UNHCR Statute also call upon states to 
co-operate with the UNHCR in protecting refugees and to promote voluntary 
repatriation.147  
Refugee status is not a permanent solution. Hence, the refugee status ceases to 
exist under certain circumstances. This can be one of the reasons that the Statute of 
the UNHCR provides for the cessation of refugee status. 
2.3.2 CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS 
Article 6 A (ii) (e) and (f) of the UNHCR Statute provides for the cessation of refugee 
status and provides that the competence of the High Commissioner shall cease to 
apply to any person defined in section A above if: 
“(e) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with 
which has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, claim 
grounds other than those of personal convenience for continuing to 
refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality. 
Reasons of a purely economic character may not be invoked; or 
(f) Being a person who has no nationality, he can no longer, because the 
circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a 
refugee have ceased to exist and he is able to return to the country of his 
former habitual residence, claim grounds other than those of personal 
convenience for continuing to refuse to return to that country.” 
The Statute of the UNHCR contributed immensely to the improvement of the legal 
regime intended to refugee protection.148 This ultimately, then also paved the way for 
the establishment of the 1951 UN Convention.149 
                                                          
146 Chapter II 6 B 8 (c) of the UNHCR Statute. 
147 Chapter 1 (1) of the UNHCR Statute. 
148 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) 19. 
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2.4 THE 1951 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
The 1951 UN Convention was initially suggested at the UN Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries which met in Geneva in 1951.150 During this Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries it was discussed that a draft convention should be made which will 
consolidate all previous efforts towards the protection of refugees into one 
consolidated instrument for the protection of refugees.151 This led to the adoption of 
the 1951 UN Convention on 28 July 1951.152  
During the 1951 Conference of Plenipotentiaries, states emphasised that there is no 
right to asylum.153 The Conference also did not guarantee the principle of non-
refoulement.154 
The 1951 UN Convention was also influenced by the 1948 UDHR.155 The UDHR is 
the first instrument to introduce the concept of the right to seek and enjoy asylum.  
Notwithstanding the latter, it cannot be seen as legally binding to member states.156 
Although the concept of the right to and the enjoyment of asylum are not provided by 
the 1951 UN Convention, it has influenced principles i.e. non-refoulement found in 
the 1951 UN Convention. The refugee regime under the auspices of the 1951 UN 
Convention concentrated more on specific rights of the refugees that are not fully 
covered by the human rights regime.157 The 1951 UN Convention is the principal 
international treaty which provides protection for refugees.158 
                                                                                                                                                                      
149 Ibid. 
150  McAdam (2007) 29. 
151 See introductory note by the office of the UNHCR Convention and Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (1996).5. Stenberg (1989) 59. See also, McAdam (2007) 29. 
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2.4 DEFINITION OF A REFUGEE 
In its initial phase, the definition of a refugee in terms of the 1951 UN Convention was 
limited to people who became refugees “as a result of events occurring before 1 
January 1951.”159 This particular definition furthermore, contained a geographical 
limitation to “events occurring in Europe”.160  
Article I of the 1951 UN Convention provides that the term “Refugee” shall apply to 
any person who: 
“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well 
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it.”161   
Article I of the 1951 UN Convention extends further and provides, in an alternative 
way, that the reference to time frame “events occurring before 1 January 1951” shall 
mean, either “events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951”; or “events 
occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951.”162 The impact of such time 
framework and geographical limitations can be seen in the exclusion of refugees 
from Africa and elsewhere.163 
The 1951 UN Convention emerged during the aftermath of WW II.164 Consequently, 
the definition of the 1951 UN Convention clearly indicates that it was formulated 
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focusing mainly on European refugees.165 The time frame also indicates that it was 
designed specifically for events occurring before 1 January 1951.166  
2.4.1 RIGHTS OF REFUGEES 
The 1951 UN Convention provides for specific rights for refugees which are required 
to be protected by the signatory country of refuge.167 These rights include among 
other things, the right of the refugees to be treated with the same standard of 
treatment that other non-nationals or nationals receive from the host state,168 and the 
right to non-refoulement. 
2.4.1.1 Non-Refoulement  
Significantly, this research is the right provided by the principle of non-refoulement in 
terms of article 33.1 of the 1951 UN Convention. This right has been said to 
constitute part of customary international law although other scholars hold a different 
view.169 Article 33.1 of the 1951 UN Convention provides that: 
“No contracting state shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of the territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership to a particular social group or political opinion.”  
Article 33.2 of the 1951 UN Convention provides for an exception to the principle of 
non-refoulement and states that: 
“The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a 
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to 
the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted 
by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to 
the community of that country.” 
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The protection of rights of refugees i.e. non-refoulement, will however not be realised 
when other important interests come into play e.g. when the refugee constitutes a 
threat to the host country. This is the exception to the principle of non-refoulment. A 
refugee has the right to enter the country and seek asylum and not be returned to the 
country of origin at high seas which are not provided for in the 1951 UN 
Convention.170 Rights such as rights not to be punished for illegal entry also 
strengthen the principle of non-refoulement.171  
2.4.1.2 Cessation 
Article 1.C.5 and 6 of the 1951 UN Convention also makes provision for the 
cessation of refugee status in the following circumstances: 
“(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with 
which he has been recognized as a refugee has ceased to exist, continue 
to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; 
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the 
circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a 
refugee has ceased to exist, able to return to his country of habitual 
residence.” 
The cessation of refugee status in terms of the 1951 UN Convention clearly indicates 
that the granting of refugee status is not a permanent solution as it has to come to an 
end when certain requirements are met.172 This sentiment was echoed well by the 
first High Commissioner for Refugees, Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart who stated 
that refugee status should “not be granted for a day longer than absolutely 
necessary, and should come to an end.”173  
In order to protect the rights of refugees who might still be in need of protection 
regardless of cessation of status, article 1.C.6 of the 1951 UN Convention provides 
                                                          
170 D’Orsi (2013) 23-4. 
171 See article 31 of the 1951 UN Convention. UNHCR The 1951 UN Convention and Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (2011) 4.  
172 Johnson Ceased Circumstances and the End of Refugee Status: The Use of Article 1C (5) 
in South Africa (2012) 4. 
173 Johnson (2012) 4. 
29 
 
for an exception to cessation due to “compelling reasons arising out of previous 
persecution.” This implies that regardless of the cessation of status, a refugee who 
still needs protection will not be refouled back to a place where his/her life might be in 
danger. 
2.5 THE 1967 PROTOCOL 
In an effort to broaden the scope of the 1951 UN Convention, the General Assembly 
2198 (XXI) adopted the 1967 Protocol after it has been approved by the Economic 
and Social Council Resolution 1186 (XLI) of 18 November 1966.174 The 1951 UN 
Convention’s applicability was restricted to the time frame of “events occurring before 
1 January 1951” in Europe.175 The 1967 Protocol, in an effort to broaden the scope of 
the 1951 UN Convention, removed this time frame from the Convention.176 
Although the 1967 Protocol was adopted in order to broaden the scope of the 1951 
UN Convention, it remains, however, a separate instrument from the 1951 UN 
Convention.177 The 1967 Protocol is not an amendment to the 1951 UN Convention; 
it is a treaty on its own.178 This has the implication that a state can accede to one and 
not the other.179 This resonates with articulation of Paul Weis who said that “with the 
entry into force of the Protocol there exist, in fact, two treaties dealing with the same 
subject matter.” 180 
The definition of a refugee under the 1967 Protocol above makes reference to the 
refugee definition in terms of 1951 UN Convention with certain exception concerning 
the time and place of its application. The only difference provided by the 1967 
Protocol to the definition in the 1951 UN Convention is with respect to time and 
place. In other words, the 1967 Protocol has extended the definition of a refugee in a 
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manner which applies to every refugee irrespective of time and geographical 
location.  
2.6 THE 1969 OAU REFUGEE CONVENTION  
The problem of refugees was not only limited to European communities, Africa also 
had, and still has refugee problems. The main refugee protection treaty in Africa is 
the 1969 OAU Convention.181 
During the post-colonial era, the African states faced challenges of conflicts which 
eventually led to the displacement of people and the emergence of refugees.182 The 
inefficiencies of refugee protection as provided by the 1951 UN Convention in Africa 
prompted the need to adopt an instrument which was intended to address the 
challenges facing the African refugees.183 African states saw an urgent need for 
refugee protection and drafted and adopted the 1969 OAU Convention,184 which 
became the only regional binding instrument, which provides for refugee 
protection.185 
Before the drafting and adoption of the 1969 OAU Convention, a commission was set 
up to investigate aspects concerning the refugees in Africa.186 The result of this 
commission, with the input of the UNHCR, was a draft Convention which was later 
prepared as a final draft and therefore adopted by the Assembly of Heads of States 
and Governments.187 During the period countries which did not yet ratify the 1951 UN 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol were advised to do so. These instruments 
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remained the main international treaties which protect refugees. Consequently, the 
realisation of The 1969 OAU Convention complements the latter instruments.188  
The 1969 OAU Convention was concluded on 10 September 1969, during the Sixth 
Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa to deal with refugee matters in Africa.189 The 1969 
OAU Convention entrenches the principle of non-refoulement and has a binding 
effect on member states.190 
The 1969 OAU Convention therefore entered into force on 20 June 1974.191 The 
1969 OAU Convention also broadens the definition of the refugee, other than the one 
provided by the 1951 UN Convention and the UNHCR Charter, in order to provide for 
the protection of refugees in the African context. 192  
The 1969 OAU Convention has been commended as the first refugee treaty to codify 
the principle of voluntary repatriation.193 It has also been commended as the 
instrument which offers the best solution for African refugee problems.194 The 
Resolution on Voluntary Repatriation195 supplements the 1969 OAU Convention by 
making provisions for “legal and practical” matters which are important for 
repatriation but not covered in the 1969 OAU Convention.196  
2.6.1 RESOLUTION ON VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF AFRICAN REFUGEES 
The Resolution on voluntary repatriation was reached in 1975 at the Twenty Fourth 
Ordinary Session after the progress that was made in decolonising the African States 
and considering the need for refugees to return and rebuild their countries of 
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origin.197 It emphasised the need for the repatriation to be voluntary. The Resolution 
on voluntary repatriation, therefore, appealed to Member States to: 
• Respect the voluntary nature of repatriation. 
• Encourage the refugees to return to the country of their origin out of their own 
free will. 
• Encourage Member States to co-operate with the UNHCR and other 
voluntary agencies that assist in voluntary repatriation. 
• Allow persons of mixed marriages to decide freely and voluntarily on 
repatriation. 
• Urge the international organisation to fund the repatriation and 
reintegration.198 
2.6.2 THE DEFINITION OF REFUGEE UNDER THE 1969 OAU CONVENTION 
Article 1 of the 1969 OAU Convention provides that the term “Refugee” shall mean 
every person who: 
“1. Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it.”  
2. The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to 
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously 
disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin 
or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in 
order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or 
nationality.” 
                                                          
197 Resolution on Voluntary Repatriations.  
198 Article 3. a-e of the Resolution on Voluntary Repatriations.  
33 
 
The first part of the definition of a “refugee” under the 1969 OAU Convention, 
resembles that of the 1951 UN Convention save for additional protection on the 
second part of the definition.199 
2.6.3 THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES 
The 1969 OAU Convention provides for human rights protection with specific 
reference to refugees as well.200 The principle of non-refoulement remains by large 
the cornerstone of the rights of refugees. 
2.6.3.1 Non-Refoulement  
Article 2.3 of the 1969 OAU Convention concerns the principle of non-refoulement 
and provides that: 
“No person shall be subject by a Member State to measures such as 
rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to 
return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty 
would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article I, paragraph 1 and 
2.” 
The provision on non-refoulement in terms of the 1969 OAU Convention is at most 
the same as that which is provided by article 3.1 of the UN Declaration on Territorial 
Asylum.201 This has the implication that the principle of non-refoulement in terms of 
the 1969 OAU Convention is broader than that provided by the 1951 UN 
Convention.202 However, the provision of non-refoulement in terms of the 1969 OAU 
Convention is not absolute.203 
The explicit differences between the 1969 OAU Convention and the 1951 UN 
Convention with regards to non-refoulement is that unlike the 1951 UN Convention, 
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the 1969 OAU Convention does not provide for the exception due to national 
security.204  
The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, article 5.1 provides for voluntary repatriation: 
“The essential voluntary character shall be respected in all cases and no refugee 
shall be repatriated against his will.” 
The provision on voluntary repatriation effectively strengthens the principle of non-
refoulement, due to its requirement on voluntariness by the refugee to return.205 This 
is also in line with the provision of the UNHCR Statute which provides for 
voluntariness in repatriations.206 
2.6.3.2 Cessation  
Article 1.4.e of the 1969 OAU Convention provides that this Convention shall cease 
to apply to any refugee if: 
“he can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which 
he was recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse 
to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality …” 
  
Cessation under the 1969 OAU Convention resembles that of the 1951 UN 
Convention except that the 1969 OAU Convention does not provide for the exception 
to cessation due to “compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution.”207 This 
subsequently means that the necessity for refugee protection will no longer be 
upheld under protection rights once the cessation has been invoked.208 This implies 
that the rights of refugees in terms of the principle of non-refoulement would be 
violated. The cessation under those circumstances will violate the rights of refugees 
not to be returned to a place where their lives will be in danger. 
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2.7 International Human Rights Instruments  
Human rights protection and refugee rights protection are two sides of the same coin. 
They are inseparable. There can never be a refugee’s issue without violation of 
human rights. International human rights instruments have a tremendous influence 
on refugee protection. The UNGA monitors the human rights and refugee challenges 
and proposes universal protection through conventions, declarations and resolutions. 
2.7.1 THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
The ECHR has contributed immensely towards the development of the principle of 
non-refoulement, despite its lack of explicit reference to it.209 The ECHR was adopted 
in 1950 and became operational in 1953 to give effect to rights provided for within the 
UDHR.210 
Article 3 of the ECHR provides that “no one shall be subject to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” Despite the ECHR’s lack of explicit reference to 
non-refoulement, any state which returns a person to a country where there are 
substantial grounds that such a person may be tortured or treated inhumanly, such a 
state will be in breach of article 3 of the ECHR.211 These sentiments were also 
echoed in the South African Constitutional Court in the Mohamed case.212 The 
decisions of the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) has also strengthened 
the principle of non-refoulement when interpreting article 3 of the ECHR, as observed 
in the Soering case, as well as the Chahal case.213 
2.7.2 THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
The ICCPR was adopted in 1966 and entered in force in 1976. The Covenant is an 
integral instrument to the human rights protection regime which is binding on states 
parties.214 The ICCPR enhances the refugee protection in that it extends protection 
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not offered by the 1951 UN Convention.215 The Human Rights Committee (HRC)216 is 
the implementer and interpretative tool in cases involving the application of the 
ICCPR.217 
The ICCPR, just like the ECHR does not explicitly provide for the principle of non-
refoulement.218 However, article 6, which provides for the right to life and article 7, 
which provides for the prohibition on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment is of relevance to the principle of non-refoulement.219 
Furthermore, the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR which came into effect in 
1991 abolishes the death penalty within states parties.220 The HRC, on its 1992 
General Comment, has interpreted and applied articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR to 
include non-refoulement.221 Article 7 of the ICCPR which is more relevant to the 
principle of non-refoulement provides that: 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without 
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” 
In an effort to elevate the principle of non-refoulement, in 1992, the HRC, on its 
General Comment no: 20 on article 7 of the ICCPR expressed its recognition of non-
refoulement and stated that states should not by their action expose individuals to 
torture, cruel inhuman or degrading treatment.222 
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Furthermore, on its General Comment Number 31 of 2004 on the legal obligations, 
the HRC decided that states parties to the ICCPR should not return the person where 
he or she may be exposed to harm.”223 
In order to express its concern for protection of refugees, the HRC, on its Concluding 
Observation on Tanzania, held that:224 
“no refugee be returned to another State unless it is certain that, once 
there, he or she shall not be executed or subjected to torture or other 
form of inhuman treatment (articles 6 and 7).” 
This implies that the rights in terms of articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR are also 
applicable to refugees. Wouters observes that when it is discovered that a person is 
a refugee, measures should be taken not to refoule the refugee to a country where 
his or her rights in terms of articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR would be infringed.225  
In order to strengthen the absolute nature of the rights under article 7 of the ICCPR, 
the HRC confirmed in its Concluding Observation on Canada in 1999 that: 
“The State party should recognize the absolute nature of the prohibition 
of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, which in no 
circumstances can be derogated from...”226  
2.7.3 THE 1967 UN DECLARATION ON TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 
Other than the UDHR, the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum227 also recognises 
the right to asylum.228 The UDHR’s influence impacted upon the right to asylum 
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which manifested/established the first international instrument to provide the right to 
asylum.229 
Article 1.1 of the 1967 UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum provides that: 
“Asylum granted by the State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to 
persons entitled to article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, including persons struggling against colonialism, shall be 
respected by all other States.” 
Article 1.2 provides the exception to the right to seek and enjoy asylum: 
“The right to seek and enjoy asylum may not be invoked by any person 
with respect to whom  there are serious reasons for considering that he 
has committed a crime against peace, a war crime against humanity, as 
defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in 
respect of such crimes.” 
Article 3 of the 1967 UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum on non-refoulement 
provides that: 
“no person referred to in article 1, paragraph 1, shall be subject to 
measures such as rejection at the frontier or, if he has already entered 
the territory in which he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to 
any state where he may be subject to persecution.” 
2.7.4 THE 1981 AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS 
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) was adopted by the 
OAU in 1981 which is the principal African human rights instrument.230 Article 12 of 
the ACHPR provides for the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution as well 
as the right to return to one’s own country of origin.231 The right to seek and enjoy 
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asylum from persecution expanded on the 1969 OAU Convention which urged states 
to accommodate asylum seekers in their territories.232  
The ACHPR then led to the establishment of the Human Rights Court.233 The 2008 
Protocol on the Statute of African Court of Justice and Human Rights, created a court 
system to hear human rights cases as well as other cases.234 
The Human Rights Court has dealt with different cases on issues such as voluntary 
return, the right to asylum, implementation of the cessation clause, as well as 
repatriation. 
2.7.5 THE 1984 CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND 
DEGRADING PUNISHMENT 
The CAT was adopted by the General Assembly in 1984 and became operational in 
1987 in order to forbid torture.235  
The CAT is one of the international instruments which have contributed immensely 
towards the development of the principle of non-refoulement in that it absolutely bars 
refoulement to torture.236  
Article 3.1 of the CAT provides: 
“No State Party shall expel, return (“Refoule”) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” 
The principle of non-refoulement in terms of article 3 of the CAT is influenced by 
article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention, and applies only to circumstances where the 
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person would face torture upon return.237 Article 3 of the CAT provides protection 
irrespective of the person’s nationality or legal status and cannot be derogated.238  
Article 3 of the CAT also provides for protection against expulsion or deportation of 
an alien, extradition of a criminal, and all forms of involuntary removal to face torture 
without exception, even where a person is regarded as a threat to national security 
interest.239 The protection under article 3 of the CAT is similar to article 7 of the 
ICCPR in that they absolutely bar refoulement, even where the national security 
interest is at stake. In order to strengthen the absolute character of article 3 of the 
CAT, article 2.2 of the CAT provides that: 
“no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or 
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, 
may be invoked as a justification of torture.” 
The absolute character of article 3 of the CAT was also emphasised in the South 
African Constitutional Court judgment in the Mohamed case.240 
2.8 SOUTH AFRICA’S REFUGEE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Before South Africa ratified the 1969 OAU Convention and the 1951 UN Convention, 
the Aliens Control Act 69 of 1991 was still in place which to a larger extent was in 
contravention of the international obligations towards refugees.241 South Africa 
ratified the 1969 OAU Convention on 15 December 1995, and the 1951 UN 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol on 12 January 1996.242   
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On 9 July 1996, South Africa ratified and became a party to the ACHPR,243 similarly 
to the UDHR which provides for the right to asylum.244 South Africa has also ratified 
the ICCPR as well as the CAT in 1998.245  
The ratification of international instruments by South Africa has the implication that 
South Africa, other than to refrain from measures which undermine the objectives of 
e.g. the CAT, has a positive duty under international law246  to take measures which 
will ensure that the objectives of the CAT are not undermined.247 This was evident in 
the Mohamed case when the South African Constitutional Court decided that South 
Africa infringed Mohamed’s constitutional rights, by sending him to a state where he 
might be sentenced to death if found guilty.248 
Although the Constitution makes provision against torture, South Africa is yet to 
enact domestic legislations that criminalise torture as required by the CAT.249 Article 
2 of the CAT stipulates: 
“1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory 
under its jurisdiction. 
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war 
or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other p. ublic 
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture 
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be 
invoked as a justification of torture.” 
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The ratification of international instruments by South Africa paved the way to 
the enactment of the Refugee Act 130 of 1998 which came into force in 
2000.250 The Immigration Act 13 of 2002 was promulgated to bring the Aliens 
Control Act 96 of 1991 in line with the international accepted standards 
concerning immigration.251 The Aliens Control Act was declared to be in conflict 
with the Constitution.”252 
2.8.1 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, ACT 108 OF 1996 
The South African Constitution, more specifically, section 10 of the Bill of Rights, is 
highly inclusive in that it offers the protection to everyone, including asylum seekers 
and refugees.253 Section 7 of the Bill of Rights makes provision to the effect that 
everyone in South Africa is entitled to human dignity, equality and freedom.254 
The Constitution makes provisions for the status of international law in South Africa. 
Section 231(4) of the Constitution provides:255 
“Any international agreement becomes law in the republic when it is 
enacted into law by national legislature…” 
The provision of section 231 of the Constitution was also confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court in the Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa256 
case, where it was held that the international agreement should be enacted into law 
by the national legislature. 257  
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Other sections of the Constitution make provisions for status of international law in 
South Africa. Section 233 provides that South African courts should interpret the 
legislations in such a way that they are in compliance with international law instead of 
being in conflict with international law.258 Section 233 has the implication that when 
interpreting the Refugee Act, regard should be had to international instruments which 
deal with the protection of refugees.259 Section 232 elevates the status of customary 
international law as law in South Africa, unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution 
or Act of Parliament.260 
The relationship that exists between South African law and international law as 
provided by the Constitution therefore empowers the South African courts to apply 
international law when interpreting the Refugee Act.261 Although South Africa is a 
party to the most relevant treaties which protect refugees, South Africa has at times 
refouled refugees or asylum seekers against its international obligations of non-
refoulement.262 
2.8.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN REFUGEE ACT 130 OF 1998 
The Refugee Act 130 of 1998263 provides protection of the refugees by recognising 
their rights within South Africa.264 The Refugee Act provides among other things for 
the definition of a refugee, non-refoulement and the cessation of refugee status. The 
Refugee Act has been amended by the Refugee Amendment Act.265 Both Refugee 
Amendment Acts however, did not amend the provisions of the definition of a 
refugee; the principle of non-refoulement, as well as the cessation of refugee status 
nor did it insert the provision on voluntary repatriation. 
Section 6(1) of the Refugee Act provides that the Refugee Act should be interpreted 
in line with the 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU 
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Convention, the 1948 UDHR, as well as other relevant conventions and agreements 
which South Africa is party to. This subsequently, ensures the implementation of 
international law in South Africa. 
2.8.2.1 Definition of a “Refugee”  
Section 3 of the Refugee Act provides that a person qualifies for refugee status for 
the purpose of this Act if that person: 
“(a) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it; or  
(b) owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or 
events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his 
country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual 
residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of 
origin or nationality.” 
The above definition of a “refugee” encompasses the definitions contemplated in both 
the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention.266  
2.8.2.2 Rights of “Refugee”  
2.8.2.2.1 Non-Refoulement  
Section 2 of the Refugee Act deals with the principle of non-refoulement and 
provides that: 
“notwithstanding any provision of this Act or any other law to the 
contrary, no person may be refused entry into the Republic, expelled, 
extradited or returned to any other country or be subject to any 
similar measure, if as a result of such refusal, expulsion, extradition, 
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return or other measure, such person is compelled to return to or 
remain in a country where:  “(a) he or she may be subject to 
persecution on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion, or membership of a particular social group; or 
(b) his or her life, physical safety or freedom would be threatened on 
account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or 
other events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either 
part or the whole of that country.” 
It seems that the principle of non-refoulement as the cornerstone of refugee 
protection has developed to a level where it can be regarded as customary 
international law.267 Furthermore, the Refugee Act seems to entrench the principle of 
non-refoulement far beyond what international law provides.268 
2.8.2.2.2 Cessation  
The Refugee Act also provides for the cessation of refugee status. It provides in 
section 5(1) (e) that: 
“a person ceases to qualify for refugee status for the purpose of this Act if: 
(a) he or she voluntarily avails himself or herself of the protection of the country 
of his or her nationality; or 
(b) having lost his or her nationality, he or she by some voluntary and 
formal act requires it; or 
(c) he or she becomes a citizen of the Republic or acquires the nationality 
of some other country and enjoys the protection of the country of his or 
her new nationality; or 
(d) he or she voluntarily re-establishes himself or herself in the country 
which he or she left; or 
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(e) he or she can no longer continue to refuse to avail himself or herself 
of the protection of the country of his or her nationality because the 
circumstances in connection with which he or she has been recognised 
as a refugee have ceased to exist and no other circumstances have 
arisen which justify his or her continued recognition as a refugee.” 
Section 5(2) provides that subsection (1)(e) does not apply to a refugee who is able 
to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of the country of nationality.269 The exception in 
terms of section 5(2) reflects a humanitarian approach by South Africa since it is 
based not on future persecution but the previous persecution which still reflects upon 
the refugee psychology.270 
The provision on cessation as well as the exception in terms of the Refugee Act is in 
compliance with the 1951 UN Convention.271 
2.8.2.2.3. Voluntary Repatriation 
Voluntary repatriation is one of the major provisions provided by the 1969 OAU 
Convention272 as opposed to the 1951 UN Convention. Although South Africa has 
undertaken to enact the Refugee Act which is in compliance with both the 1969 OAU 
Convention and the 1951 UN Convention, the Refugee Act did not incorporate the 
provision of voluntary repatriation as provided by the 1969 OAU Convention.273 In 
practical terms, South Africa has overlooked the guiding principle in article 5 of the 
1969 OAU Convention which prescribes the voluntary nature of repatriation. 
Nevertheless, it is still a question of the direct implementation of a treaty in South 
Africa, until the incorporation of provisions of the international treaty into the domestic 
legislation to be binding within South Africa.274 
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2.8.3 THE IMMIGRATION ACT 13 OF 2002 
The Immigration Act 13 of 2002275 was enacted to regulate the admission of the 
persons to, their residence in, and departure from the Republic; and to provide for 
other matters connected therewith.276 The Immigration Act was amended by the 
Immigration Amendment Act277 in 2004 and the Immigration Amendment Act278 in 
2011. Section 23 of the Immigration Act was substituted by the Immigration 
Amendment Act 2004, to provide for issuing an Asylum Transit Permit at the port of 
entry, to enable an asylum seeker to apply for asylum in South Africa.279 
2.8.4 PROMOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT 3 OF 2000 
The Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution provides that everyone has the 
right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedural fair.280 The 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act281 gives effect to the provision of the Bill of 
Rights with regards to just administrative action.282 The word everyone above 
includes all persons in the Republic of South Africa. This would also include refugees 
or foreigners whether legally or illegally present in the Republic. 
2.9 CONCLUSION  
This chapter illustrates that the human rights regime preceded the development of 
the refugee regime. It illustrates further how the development of the international 
human rights regime led to the development of the international refugee regime. This 
chapter also highlights the relevance of the principle of non-refoulement to the 
voluntary repatriation of refugees. 
The UDHR is the earliest international human right instrument which led to the 
development of the refugee regime. Of utmost importance to refugee protection, the 
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UDHR provides for a right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution in another 
country although it does not create legal obligation on the states as the UDHR is 
however, not binding on Member States. 
On the contrary, the legally binding instruments which provide for refugee protection, 
that is, the 1951 UN Convention and its 1967 Protocol make no mention of a right to 
asylum.283 The 1951 UN Convention is the principal refugee protection treaty and 
was modified by the 1967 Protocol to make it universally applicable.  
The UNHCR is the agency tasked with the protection of refugees and promotes 
durable solutions to the plight of refugees. Voluntary repatriation is regarded by the 
UNHCR as the most durable solution to the plight of refugees. Furthermore, the 
UNHCR is an agency responsible for supervising and implementation of refugee 
instruments.284 
In the meantime, the human rights regime developed parallel to the refugee regime. 
There are several human rights treaties, including the ECHR, ICCPR, the UN 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, and the CAT, that either directly or indirectly bars 
refoulement. Consequently, refoulement that will lead to torture, inhuman, degrading 
treatment of punishment is prohibited. 
The decisions of the ECtHR as seen in the Chahal and Soering cases also 
strengthen the principle of non-refoulement. The HRC which enforces the provisions 
of the ICCPR also recognises the principle of non-refoulement as seen in its 
Conclusion Observations and General Comments.  
The uniqueness of challenges facing African refugees also saw the development of 
the refugee protection regime on the African continent in the form of the 1969 OAU 
Convention, the ACHPR, as well as the Human Rights Court which adjudicate human 
rights abuse cases. 
It is evident that the South African refugee regime is influenced by international 
norms, constitutional norms and statutory norms. International norms include both 
refugee and human rights regime. South Africa is party to the refugee treaties as well 
as the human rights treaties. 
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The South African Constitution provides for the bill of rights, similar to one provided 
by the international human rights instrument(s) and empowers the legislature to 
enact laws that provide for international treaties as well as recognising that 
customary international law is law in the Republic. South African case law also 
highlights the application and interpretation of international law as seen in the 
Mohamed case, to mention but a few.  
States and academics, however, are reluctant to view refugee regime and human 
rights regime as intertwined. However, the interpretation of the refugee and human 
rights regime by the ECtHR and the South Africa Constitutional Court suggest that 
these two regimes are intertwined. The conclusion that can be made is that the 
international refugee law and human rights law operate alongside each other and 
therefore provide essential interpretative tools to the principle of voluntary 
repatriation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION 
3.1 BACKGROUND AND STATUTE  
The principle of voluntary repatriation of refugees was incorporated into the UNHCR 
Statute which was established as a consequence to forced repatriation occurred in 
WW II.285 Voluntary repatriation of refugees is governed directly and indirectly by 
different statutes within the international sphere as well as on the regional plane. 
Although voluntary repatriation is not directly mentioned in the 1951 UN Convention, 
which is the principal refugee protection treaty, the 1951 UN Convention has certain 
provisions which place voluntary repatriation in the context of refugee protection.286  
One of the provisions of the 1951 UN Convention which places voluntary repatriation 
in the context of refugee protection includes the non-refoulement which is the 
cornerstone of refugee protection.287 Many scholars on international level state that 
the principle of non-refoulement has attained the status of customary international 
law. This indicates at the continuing relevance and resilience of this international 
regime of rights and principles, including at its core the principle of non-refoulement, 
which its applicability is embedded in customary international law.288 
The UNHCR Statute provides for voluntary repatriation; however, the provisions of 
the UNHCR Statute do not constitute a binding treaty on states. The 1969 OAU 
Convention is by far the only instrument that specifically provides for the principle of 
voluntary repatriation and therefore creates legal obligation on member states.289 
Although international human rights instruments do not provide for voluntary 
repatriation, it has entrenched the principle of non-refoulement which 
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quintessentially, constitutes the foundation for voluntary repatriation.290 Such 
instruments include article 3 of the 1984 CAT; article 7 of the 1966 ICCPR; article 
12.3 of the 1981 ACHPR, as well as the ECHR.291 In addition to the refugee and 
human rights regime, declarations and resolutions which apply in specific regions 
entrench the principle of non-refoulement.292 
The human rights regime has contributed immensely to the development of the 
refugee protection regime. In other words, the refugee protection regime cannot be 
applied in isolation. The latter refugee protection regime approach ultimately 
functions in conjunction with the human rights regime.  The Declaration of States 
Parties to the 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol reaffirmed the importance 
of the role that the human rights regime and the regional instruments such as the 
1969 OAU Convention and the European Council Conclusions.293  
The complementary nature between the refugee regime and human rights law were 
also echoed by the South African Constitutional Court in the Mohamed case where 
the Constitutional Court held that the recognition of human rights by the states should 
be visible in all state action.294 Although South Africa is party to the 1969 OAU 
Convention which provides for voluntary repatriation of refugees, South Africa does 
not encompass domestic legislation which provides for voluntary repatriation of 
refugees. 
This chapter deals with the legal framework governing refugee protection specifically, 
voluntary repatriation. This chapter furthermore elaborates the cessation clause and 
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non-refoulement because these principles are core determinants of voluntariness of 
repatriation. 
3.2 REPATRIATION 
Field defines repatriation as “returning refugees to their home country when it is safe, 
organized and facilitated by UNHCR to ensure greater security and re-integration”.295 
Long states: repatriation should not be just a return; it should be an integrated 
political process which facilitates return with the restoration of all rights of the refugee 
in the country of return.296 Repatriation is the frequently applied solution and is 
regarded as the most durable solution to the plight of refugees.297 The international 
human rights regime is also a proponent of repatriation as seen in the provision of 
the UDHR which provides for the right to leave and to return to one’s own country.298 
The right to leave and to return to one’s own country is closely related to voluntary 
repatriation. 
3.2.1 CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS 
Voluntary repatriation usually follows after the declaration of cessation of refugee 
status by the country of refuge. The cessation of refugee status is preceded by the 
change of circumstances in the country of origin e.g. in the case of the end of 
hostilities, signing of peace treaties, and recognition of human rights. 
Articles 1.C.5 and 6 of the 1951 UN Convention provide for the cessation of refugee 
status due to changed circumstances.299 Articles 1C.5 and 6 of the 1951 UN 
Convention make provision for the cessation of refugee status in the following 
circumstances: 
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“(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with 
which he has been recognized as a refugee has ceased to exist continue 
to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; 
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under 
section A1 (1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons 
arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the 
protection of the country of nationality; 
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the 
circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a 
refugee has ceased to exist, able to return to his country of habitual 
residence.” 
Article 1.C of the 1951 UN Convention provides for the cessation of refugee status if 
the circumstances which caused the refugee to flee his or her country of nationality 
have come to an end.300 It also provides that under such circumstances mentioned 
above, the refugee does not have a choice but to avail him or herself to the 
protection of the country of nationality.301  
The cessation in terms of the 1951 UN Convention, however, is not absolute, article 
1.C.5 of the 1951 UN Convention further provides exception to the cessation clause 
and states that refugees who can provide “compelling reasons arising out of previous 
persecution” will be excluded to the application of the cessation clause.302 
Cessation of refugee status also includes the loss of refugee status, return to the 
country of origin, as well as rights attached to such a status.303 It is for this reason 
that the cessation of refugee status should be determined on an individual refugee, 
and not on the generalisation since refugee status is an individual status.304 The 
individual determination of the cessation of refugee status will also be of assistance 
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in deciding whether a specific refugee is to be exempted from the cessation of 
refugee status in terms of the cessation clause.305  
Hathaway observes that the application of the cessation clause is a straightforward 
exercise.306 He observes that once the requirements of article 1.C.5 have been 
complied with, the states parties are therefore entitled to repatriate all refugees who 
no longer need protection.307 Hathaway further observes that other than the 
application of the cessation clause, the host country must also apply the international 
human rights law.308 This is done, he observes:  
“account must be taken of the former refugees’ right to security of person; 
to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; and not to be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her family 
life.”309 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam observe that in deciding on the applicability of the 
cessation of refugee status, it is of utmost importance to look at why the individual 
fled his or her country of origin and whether that reason has ceased to exist.310 
Further that it is equally important to determine whether there is actual protection for 
the refugee in the country of origin.311 After it has been confirmed that the reason 
which caused the flight has ceased to exist and that there is actual protection in the 
country of nationality, it will be unfair for the refugee to reject protection in the country 
of his or her nationality.312  
Chapter 2 6.A.2 of the UNHCR Statute provides for the cessation of refugee status 
due to changed circumstances.313 The provisions of cessation in terms of the 
UNHCR statute are more or less the same with that of the 1951 UN Convention. 
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When it comes to the interpretation of the exception to article 1.C. 5. of the 1951 UN 
Convention, the UNHCR and the UNHCR Executive Committee have positioned 
themselves.314 The UNHCR has observed, in its 1979 Handbook, that during the 
drafting of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, most refugees were statutory 
refugees.315 Nevertheless, an exception to article 1.C. 5 of the 1951 UN Convention 
signifies “a more general humanitarian principle” capable to be applied to all 
refugees.316 
The UNHCR provides in its paper on the change of circumstances that the cessation 
clauses were comprehensive and should be applied stringently.317 It further argued 
that emphasis should be placed on …  
“the level of democratic development in the country, its adherence to 
international human rights (including refugee) instruments and access 
allowed for independent national or international organizations freely to 
verify and supervise the respect for human rights”.318 
The UNHCR’s Executive Committee Conclusion No. 69 provides that the 
determination and application of the cessation clauses are the responsibility of the 
country of refuge even though the UNHCR should be involved.319 The Executive 
Committee also provides that States can also use the declaration for the cessation of 
refugee status by the UNHCR as a guideline to the determination and application of 
the cessation clause.320 The UNHCR observed that voluntary repatriation often 
rejects the need for the UNHCR to follow the procedural aspects for the cessation 
clause.321 
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The UNHCR is tasked with the supervisory mandate to the 1951 UN Convention.322 
Consequently, the establishment of the appropriateness of implementing mandatory 
repatriation is instructive requirements on host states.323 The UNHCR’s requirement 
is that before the host state can mandate repatriation, the host state must establish 
whether the change which occurred in the country of origin is substantial and long-
lasting.324 It also encourages the host state to wait for at least the minimum of 
eighteen months after a change in the country of origin to determine the durability of 
the change before implementing mandatory repatriation.325 The UNHCR also advises 
that the change which was brought about violently should call for an extended time 
frame for implementing repatriation.326 
3.2.2 THE CONDITIONS OF REPATRIATION 
Repatriation of refugees should be conducted by the country of refuge, the country of 
origin and the international refugee agencies.327 It is crucial that the conditions which 
have caused the refugees to flee must have changed substantially in the country of 
origin and there should be respect for human rights and rule of law.328 This is 
intended to prevent the backflow of refugees to the country of asylum.  
The international refugee law requires that repatriation should be conducted on a 
voluntary basis and in the manner which takes into account the safety and dignity of 
the refugee.329 
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3.2.2.1 Voluntary Repatriation  
Voluntary repatriation is regarded as the most durable solution to the plight of 
refugees.330 The UNHCR’s Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee 
Law defines voluntary repatriation as a “return to the country of origin based on the 
refugees’ free and informed decision”.331 The UNHCR’s handbook describes 
physical, legal, material, and reconciliation as the principal components of the 
principle of voluntary repatriation.332 Voluntary repatriation as a durable solution often 
follows the change of circumstances in the country of origin which has caused the 
refugee to flee, and the signing of a peace agreement is but one of the indications of 
possible voluntary repatriation.333 
The 1951 UN Convention does not provide for voluntary repatriation.334 The 1951 UN 
Convention, however, provides for the principle of non-refoulement of a refugee to a 
place where his or her life would be in danger or persecuted.335 The interplay 
between voluntary repatriation and the non-refoulement suggests that for voluntary 
repatriation to occur, subjective fears by the refugee plays a role.336 This means that 
when the refugees have fear to return to their country of origin, return should not be 
promoted. However, on the contrary, states are allowed to implement the cessation 
of status and repatriate refugees once the requirements of the cessation clause have 
been met.337 
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The 1951 Convention permits the host states to establish an end to the status of 
refugees and mandate repatriation.338 This is evident on the provision of articles 1C.5 
and 6 of the 1951 Convention which provide for the cessation of refugee status. 
Hathaway observes that states parties to the 1951 UN Convention has no obligation 
to provide protection where the refugee’s country of origin is safe for return.  When 
the circumstances which caused the refugee to escape have “ceased” to exist as 
provided by the cessation clause, the refugee does not have the protection of the 
country of refuge anymore.  The refugee can therefore be repatriated back to the 
country of origin and voluntariness by the refugee is not a requirement. Repatriation 
in this situation does not amount to refoulement as there is no risk on the refugee’s 
life. Both the 1951 UN Convention and the UNHCR Statute require that there must 
be a change in the circumstances which has caused the flight before refugee 
protection can be withdrawn. 339     
It is however, not clear whether the threshold for the required change to facilitate 
voluntary repatriation and that required to mandate repatriation by host states is 
similar.340  
Chapter 1.1 of the UNHCR Statute provides that the UNHCR shall co-operate with a 
government concerned to facilitate voluntary repatriation of refugees. It is assumed 
that the circumstances which caused the flight have changed and consequently, the 
requirements for refugee protection have ceased to exist. The UNHCR Executive 
Committee’s sight with regards to cessation is that refugee status can only be 
terminated:  
“(q) where a change of circumstances in a country is of such a profound 
and enduring nature that refugees from that country no longer require 
international protection, and can no longer continue to refuse to avail 
themselves of the protection of their country...” 341  
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The UNHCR acknowledges the cessation of refugee status due to the “fundamental 
change of circumstances” in terms of article 1.C.1 of the 1951 UN Convention. When 
the UNHCR is convinced that the changes in the country of origin are substantial, it 
may promote voluntary repatriation and cease its assistance programs.342 However, 
to the contrary, the UNHCR seems reluctant to explicitly acknowledge states powers 
to mandatory repatriate refugees when the requirements for the cessation clause 
have been complied with.343 
Hathaway observes that the failure to explicitly acknowledge the consequences of 
the cessation clause by the UNHCR is “disingenuous.”344 The fact that refugee 
protection is a temporary measure which is dependent on the existence of the need 
for protection; it needs to be explicitly acknowledged by the refugee agency.345 
Failure to acknowledge this may at times have a negative result for the protection of 
refugees who might still be in need of protection, regardless of the cessation of the 
refugee status.346 
The UNHCR also advocates that repatriation is lawful only when it is “voluntary” and 
can be done “in safety, and with dignity.”347 This, Hathaway observes, shows the 
UNHCR’s failure to distinguish between repatriation in terms of the 1951 UN 
Convention which does not require voluntariness and the UNHCR’s institutional 
mandate to promote repatriations that are voluntary.348 
Repatriation often takes place from one underdeveloped country, which does not on 
its own have the resources to repatriate, to another underdeveloped country.349 
These countries are therefore forced to repatriate under the terms of the UNHCR 
which only takes part in repatriations which are voluntary.350 Repatriations are 
therefore done under the institutional mandate of the UNHCR and not on the terms of 
the 1951 UN Convention.  
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The application of repatriations under the institutional mandate of the UNHCR, which 
only promotes voluntary repatriation, rather than the 1951 UN Convention, which 
does not require voluntariness, has also had a negative impact on the development 
of repatriation under the 1951 UN Convention.351 This is because the UNHCR is also 
involved in repatriations which do not meet the requirements of the cessation clause 
in terms of the 1951 UN Convention.352 It is also evident in the UNHCR Executive 
Committee which has “instructed” the UNHCR that: 
“(e)…from the outset of a refugee situation, the High Commissioner 
should at all times keep the possibility of voluntary repatriation for all or 
part of a group under active review and the High Commissioner, 
whenever he deems that the prevailing circumstances are appropriate, 
should actively pursue the promotion of this solution.”353 
The UNHCR’s institutional mandate is to promote only voluntary repatriation. 
Although, this is  contrary to the cessation clause in terms of the 1951 UN 
Convention, the failure to develop and acknowledge rules of mandatory repatriation 
in terms of the cessation clause under the 1951 UN Convention, has opened a 
loophole for governments which desire to avoid the requirements for the cessation 
clause.354 On the other side, governments which intend to avoid its international 
obligation for refugee protection use the UNHCR’s institutional mandate to fulfill their 
repatriations which are not really voluntary in nature.355 These governments as a 
result, rely on the UNHCR’s institutional framework to the detriment of the 
refugees.356 
The lack of clarity with regards to the differences between the UNHCR’s institutional 
mandate for voluntary repatriation and the states’ mandated repatriation, 
consequently the cessation clause, has indeed caused some disarray in refugee 
                                                          
351 Hathaway (2005) 931. 
352 Ibid.932. 
353 Conclusion adopted by the UNHCR Executive Committee no. 40 of 1985 on International 
Protection of Refugees http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b28bf1f2.pdf (accessed 3 May 2015). 
Hathaway (2005) 932. 
354 Hathaway (2005) 935. 
355 Ibid.933. 
356 Ibid. 935. 
61 
 
law.357 These differences, which are, voluntary repatriation in terms of the UNHCR 
and mandated repatriation, and the cessation clause in terms of the 1951 UN 
Convention should be clearly distinguished.358 
The UNHCR has also encouraged governments to apply its institutional mandate for 
its repatriations programs.359 This may also induce the governments which relied on 
the cessation clause to swing away from its stipulations in favour of the UNHCR’s 
institutional mandate.360 A case in point is e.g. the Zambian Government, where 
concern was about the Angolan refugees being exposed to mines on their return.361 
Zambia was not yet convinced that it was safe for the Angolan refugees to return to 
Angola due to the exposure to mines, yet, the UNHCR convinced Zambia that efforts 
would be taken to safeguard the refugees on the return to avoid mines.362 This 
indicates how the UNHCR can influence states to make use of its institutional 
mandate rather than the cessation clause in terms of the 1951 UN Convention. 
3.2.2.2 The Role of the UNHCR  
The role of the UNHCR is to provide international protection and provide permanent 
solutions for refugees.363 The UNHCR does this by facilitating, promoting and 
encouraging voluntary repatriation.364  
The UNHCR is moreover involved in the reintegration of refugees into their 
communities, rehabilitation and hence monitoring their safety after return.365 The 
UNHCR also assists governments with the transportation of the refugee and provides 
grants to assist refugees who return to start their lives back home.366 
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3.2.2.3 The Contractual Nature of Repatriation  
Organised repatriation is always preceded by the tripartite commission which 
establishes the tripartite agreement.367 The tripartite agreement therefore constitutes 
such “special agreements” and consists of three parties, hence the tripartite.368 The 
tripartite agreement outlines the responsibilities of each party to the agreement and 
constitutes a contractual obligation between the country of origin, the country of 
asylum, and the UNHCR.369 Furthermore, the tripartite outlines the legal and practical 
matters concerned with voluntary repatriation.370 The tripartite agreement constitutes 
a legally binding contract on signatories and forms the foundation and framework for 
voluntary repatriation.371 
The tripartite agreement outlines several steps to maintain the rights of refugees. 
These steps outline the responsibilities of the country of origin e.g. providing 
amnesty, the responsibilities of the country of asylum e.g. ensuring voluntariness of 
repatriation, and the mandate of the UNHCR e.g. facilitating and promoting 
repatriation.372  
The tripartite agreement further outlines the conditions and implementation of 
repatriation including reintegration, rehabilitation, reconstruction and legal safety.373   
Chapter 2.8.b of the UNHCR provides that the High Commissioner shall provide for 
the protection of refugees falling under the competence of his office by: 
“Promoting through special agreements with Governments the execution 
of any measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to 
reduce the number requiring protection;” 
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South Africa’s first tripartite agreement was in 1993 between Mozambique and the 
UNHCR.374 The latest tripartite which South Africa signed was in 2003 between 
Angola and the UNHCR.375 
3.3 THE INTEGRITY OF REPATRIATION 
The Oxford Advanced learners Dictionary defines the term integrity as, “the quality of 
being honest and having strong moral principles” and, “the state of being whole and 
not divided”376. In the repatriation process integrity refers to both life and physical 
integrity.377 The integrity of repatriation therefore means that refugees should not be 
repatriated to a place where their lives and security would be placed at risk378. 
Several scholars have proposed for balancing the voluntariness, safety and 
protection principles as a result of the decline in ethical standards for refugee 
protection.379 Voluntariness, safety and dignity are the core principles for ethical 
repatriation.380 
The integrity of repatriation is sometimes clouded by circumstances which surround 
the repatriation. Such circumstances could e.g. be where the UNHCR is under 
financial strain or political pressure, resulting in the fact, that they cannot offer 
support to some refugees within the host countries; it might even induce the UNHCR 
to repatriate refugees.381 A case in point is that of the Angolan repatriation which was 
influenced among others in order “to ease logistical pressure on both the [host] 
government[s] and UNHCR, which have had to look after a rapidly expanding 
refugee population in a time of dwindling resources.”382 Repatriation under these 
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circumstances does not comply with the international refugee protection regime as 
this compromises the mandate of the UNHCR which is to promote voluntary 
repatriation. 
3.3.1 VOLUNTARINESS OF REPATRIATION 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is no specific definition on what voluntary 
repatriation or return means, this term generally means that refugees return to their 
country of origin out of their own free will.383 The UNHCR’s guide to international 
refugee law defines voluntary repatriation as the “return to the country of origin based 
on the refugees’ free and informed decision”.384 
Voluntariness touches at the core of the international protection for refugees as well 
as the voluntary repatriation for refugees.385 Voluntariness is the lack of “physical, 
psychological or material pressure” which influences the decision of the refugee.386 
Voluntariness refers to “a freely expressed wish based on full knowledge of the 
facts”.387 This moreover, entails that the refugee must know that he or she may opt 
not to return to the country of origin and still not lose his or her refugee status.388 This 
however, is not supported by the 1951 UN Convention which empowers the states to 
mandatory repatriate refugees once it has established that there is a change of 
circumstances in the country of origin and that refugees no longer need international 
protection.  
Per analogy, the extradition of Mohamed is a striking example on the violation of the 
requirement to protect those who may face torture or capital execution.  In this 
context, the Constitutional Court of South Africa held that the voluntary decision by 
Mohamed to be extradited to the USA was not based on the full knowledge that he 
could refuse to be extradited to face torture in the USA.389 This is therefore, a 
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violation of the voluntariness principle which requires the free will based on the full 
knowledge of the facts. 
Voluntariness of repatriation can be determined by among other things, the legal 
status of a refugee within the host country as a lack of legal status might indicate 
involuntariness of return.390 The recognition of refugee status is a good indication to 
determine voluntariness.391 Consequently, the refugees whose status is not legally 
recognised will be more vulnerable to abuse and will lack international protection. 
This may force the refugees to return to the country of origin despite the dangers 
they may face there. 
Voluntariness should be based on the conditions in the country of origin and country 
of asylum which may influence the refugee’s ability to make informed decisions 
based on his or her free will.392  
Previously, voluntary repatriation was regarded as one of the solutions which were 
not viable to protect the plight of refugees because it was regarded impossible to 
achieve.393 However, when the 1950 UNHCR Statute was adopted, there was a mind 
shift with regards to voluntary repatriation.394 It was then regarded as the most viable 
solution to the plight of refugees especially during the 1990’s.395 
Conclusion No.18 of the UNHCR Statute stresses quintessentially that the intrinsic 
voluntary character of repatriation should always be maintained.396 This is also more 
in line with the provision on voluntary repatriation by the 1969 OAU Convention. The 
right of an individual to return to the country of origin is regarded as the most 
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fundamental right if it is indeed free, voluntary and being assessed on an individual 
basis.397 
In order to ensure the voluntariness of repatriation, the UNHCR should be allowed 
access to refugees and the refugees vice versa allowed access to the UNHCR with 
the view of exchanging information to enable refugees to make informed decisions 
about their return.398 
3.3.1.1 Safe return  
Safe return is the return to the place of origin where there is personal safety without 
reprisal, legal safety, material safety and physical security.399 The notion of safe 
return is not dependent on the voluntary decision by a refugee to return but by the 
conditions in the country of origin which are conducive for the return such as legal 
safety, material safety as well as physical safety.400 This is in line with the mandatory 
repatriation in terms of the 1951 UN Convention which does not require a voluntary 
decision by the refugees. 
The cessation clause in terms of article 1.C of the 1951 UN Convention only requires 
a safe return and no mention is made of voluntary repatriation.401 Voluntariness of 
repatriation is only provided for in the UNHCR’s Statute.402 As observed, therefore, 
by Hathaway “it is a wishful legal thinking to suggest that a voluntariness requirement 
can be superimposed on the text of the Refugee Convention”.403 
Hathaway argues that it is the obligation of the country of refuge to satisfy itself that 
refugees will be protected in the country of origin, only then it can terminate refugee 
status.404 It would then appear that the notion of safe return took a “continuum” 
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between voluntary repatriation and involuntary repatriation, and therefore became the 
“middle ground”.405 
Chimni cautions however, that the 1951 UN Convention was drafted when the 
international community had the perception that every refugee wishes to return 
home.406 This is in spite of the inclusion of the cessation clause within the 1951 UN 
Convention.407 This is the reason advanced by Chimni why voluntariness was not 
included in the 1951 UN Convention.408   
Goodman-Gill and McAdam observe that:  
“The promotion of voluntary repatriation by governments is seen as 
suspect, particularly when presented in the context of ‘safe return’, rather 
than on the basis of the voluntary choice of the individual.”409  
The Statute of the UNHCR provides for the states to assist the UNHCR to promote 
voluntary repatriation of refugees.410 This is an indication that the UNHCR expects 
the host states to observe the concept of voluntariness in its repatriation programs.411 
Another “central issue” in the matter of voluntary return and safe return is who 
actually decides?412 The voluntary return seems to imply that the refugee decides to 
return voluntarily, irrespective of the conditions at the country of origin.413 The “safe 
return” seems to imply that when the government has decided that the situation is 
safe at the country of origin for safe return, the refugee does not have any choice but 
to return home.414 Chimni states that:  
“It is my view that to replace the principle of voluntary repatriation by safe 
return, and to substitute the judgment of States and institutions for that of the 
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refugees, is to create space for repatriation under duress, and may be 
tantamount to refoulement.”415 
Even though the protection of refugees is of paramount importance, the application of 
repatriation rules seems to indicate that repatriation takes preference over 
protection.416 This appears in most cases because the country of refuge would 
repatriate refugees without first satisfying itself that the conditions in the country of 
origin are safe for return.417 A case in point is that of Rwandese refugees from 
Tanzania where the Tanzanian Government and the UNHCR encouraged the 
Rwandese to repatriate while there was still abuse of human rights in Rwanda.418 
3.3.1.2 Imposed return / Involuntary Return  
During September 1996, the UNHCR through its Director of Division International 
Protection, Denis McNamara, made it public that there are circumstances which can 
induce the UNHCR to acknowledge involuntary repatriation.419 McNamara 
announced the doctrine of “imposed return” which implied that refugees could be 
sent back to the country of origin even if the conditions are not conducive for 
return.”420 This notion has been borne in anticipation of situations which might 
compromise the voluntariness of repatriation.421 The UNHCR also acknowledged in 
one of its publications that the majority of refugees who have returned to their country 
of origin have done so under some form of undue influence.422 
Chimni observes that the main reason why third world countries repatriate refugees 
against their will is due to the fact that they are poor and cannot afford to care for 
refugees.423 This situation is exacerbated by lack of burden sharing in caring for 
refugees.424 Now, as a case in point, will be that of Tanzania when it abandoned its 
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“open door policy” because of financial constraints and the lack of burden sharing by 
other states.425 Chimni calls this “unfortunate but understandable” because it is 
impractical to expect a poor country to host a large number of refugees without any 
assistance.426 
In a situation where there is lack of protection and basic necessities, refugees often 
choose to return home to suffer there instead of suffering in a foreign country.427  
Hence, it cannot be said that refugees returned to the home country voluntarily.428 
Imposed/involuntary return involves two phenomena, that is, the objective approach 
and the subjective approach. The objective approach is based on the actual change 
of circumstances in the country of origin in determining the termination of refugee 
status. Subjective approach considers the refugee’s status of mind with regards to 
the willingness to return, despite the change of circumstances in the country of origin 
which warrants the termination of refugee status. 
The supporters of safe return consider the objective change of circumstances in the 
country of origin, and tend to ignore the subjective state of refugees to determine the 
termination of status.429 Hathaway is a supporter of safe return as well as the 
objective approach towards status determination of refugee status.430 Long observes, 
however that safe return cannot override voluntary repatriation.431Chimni observes 
that objectivism which considering only the change of circumstances in the country of 
origin, ignores the personal circumstances and experience of the refugees when 
deciding whether to terminate or afford refugee protection.432 Lyotard named 
objectivism as “an extreme form of injustice in which the injury suffered by the victim 
is accompanied by a deprivation of the means to prove it.”433 
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Chimni furthermore observes, that the objective interpretation of the cessation clause 
in terms of the 1951 UN Convention promotes the idea that it is for the state only, to 
determine the change of circumstances in the country of origin,434 consequently 
leading to an uncertain result.435 To the contrary, the UNHCR interplays both the 
objective and subjective elements in determining the refugee status, in that it 
promotes voluntary decisions by the refugees to return whilst also considering the 
changed circumstances in the country of origin.436 
Objectivism leads to the subjective elements of refugees taken into consideration 
when refugees decide to go home.437 However, when refugees decide to stay, the 
subjective element is ignored.438 Furthermore, when one suggests that the UNHCR 
should not promote voluntary repatriation without first inquiring whether the return is 
safe; even if refugees decide to go home on their own, one is charged with ignoring 
the will of refugees.439 In the same vein, when refugees decide to stay in the host 
country their “voices” are ignored.440 This, “heads I win and tails you lose” approach 
needs to be discarded.441  
3.4 VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION AND THE 1969 OAU CONVENTION 
The 1969 OAU Convention is the only instrument which codifies the principle of 
voluntary repatriation.442 Article 5 of the 1969 OAU Convention provides for the 
voluntary repatriation of refugees.443 The 1969 OAU Convention specifically provides 
that, “the essentially voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases 
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and no refugee shall be repatriated against his will…”444 This is more in line with 
voluntary repatriation as provided by the UNHCR Statute. The African region’s 
refugee instrument, the 1969 OAU Convention, encourages member states to open 
their borders for refugees and give them protection until it is possible to voluntarily 
repatriate the refugees.445   
Voluntary repatriation cannot be realised if the right to return as provided for by the 
international human rights instruments, is not recognised.446 The 1969 OAU 
Convention does not have a provision which provides for the right to return. 
Nonetheless, article 12.2 of the ACHPR may supplement these legal lacunae as an 
integral human rights instrument pertaining to African people.447 
3.4.1 CESSATION AND THE 1969 OAU CONVENTION 
As a general rule, the fulfillment of the cessation requirements entails that the 
refugee does not have the protection of the refuge country anymore.448 This implies 
that the circumstances which caused the refugee to escape have “ceased” to exist 
and the country of origin becomes a viable and safe home. The refugee can 
therefore be repatriated back to the country of origin and voluntariness by the 
refugee, is not a requirement.449 It is consequently, logical to refer to the “return” 
under these circumstances as “repatriation” and voluntariness by refugees is not a 
requirement.450 
Article 1.4.e of the 1969 OAU Convention is equivalent to “the right of cessation due 
to a fundamental change of circumstances found in the Refugee Convention.” There 
is, however, uncertainty within state parties to the 1969 OAU Convention.451 The 
uncertainty is due to the fact that the 1969 OAU Convention does not elaborate on 
how article 5. 1 of the1969 OAU Convention is to be reconciled with article 1.4.e of 
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the 1951 Convention.452 These words “in all cases” in Article 5.1, could also be 
interpreted to mean, that states are not entitled to repatriate even if there is no longer 
the risk of persecution in the country of origin, except where the refugee voluntarily 
consent to.453 
It is with the greatest concern that the South African refugee legislations do not 
provide for voluntary repatriation also. In spite of the fact that South Africa is a party 
to the 1969 OAU Convention which provides for voluntary repatriation, South Africa 
has yet to incorporate this principle within its domestic legislations.  
The South African Refugee Act provides, however, for the cessation of status when 
there is a change of conditions in the country of origin. This will ultimately, lead to the 
notion of safe return which is not tantamount to voluntariness by the refugees. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Repatriation refers to the return of refugees to the country of origin. Field and Long 
confirm, however, that repatriation is not just a mere return of refugees back home, it 
should be conducted in a durable manner which recognises the rights of refugees 
and integrates them to their former society. This highlights the principle of voluntary 
repatriation. 
This chapter has established that there is no international legal framework binding on 
states which provides for voluntary repatriation of refugees with the exception of the 
regional 1969 OAU Convention.454 The 1969 OAU Convention has not yet been 
accepted by the international community as a principal refugee treaty. Consequently, 
voluntary repatriation is not regarded by the international community as binding but 
rather seen as a humanitarian principle. 
The 1951 UN Convention, which is the principal refugee treaty does not provide for 
voluntary repatriation, it instead, provides for the cessation of refugee status. Both 
the UNHCR and the 1951 UN Convention, acknowledge the cessation of refugee’s 
status due to “changed circumstances,” as well as the exception due to “compelling 
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reasons”.455 Both the 1951 UN Convention and the UNHCR Statute require that there 
must be a change in the circumstances which has caused the flight before refugee 
protection can be withdrawn. 456   
The UNHCR only subsequently promotes voluntary repatriation as a result of the 
cessation of status. The 1951 UN Convention also provides for cessation due to the 
change of circumstances in the country of origin where refugees no longer need 
international protection. Under the cessation clause in terms of the 1951 UN 
Convention, voluntariness by a refugee is no longer relevant. Hathaway and 
Goodwin-Gill agree that refugees who no longer need international protection should 
be repatriated to the country of origin. 
As rightfully observed by Hathaway, the difference between voluntary repatriation in 
terms of the UNHCR Statute and the states powers to mandatory repatriate refugees, 
is the reason why the cessation clause is unclear. The UNHCR only promotes 
voluntary repatriation. The question arises: what are the consequences which follow 
when refugees refuse to repatriate after the declaration of the cessation of refugee 
status? 
Repatriation in terms of the 1951 UN Convention thrives on the notion of safe return. 
Safe return does not require voluntariness by the refugees to repatriate. Chimni, 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam suggest that to disregard voluntariness by refugees and 
concentrate on safe return will lead to the violation of the non-refoulement principle. 
Hathaway is of the view that when it is safe for refugees, states must withdraw 
international protection. South Africa is one of the countries which follow the concept 
of safe return. 
The South African Refugee Act does not provide for the voluntary repatriation which 
is more in line with the 1951 UN Convention. However, the adherence of the 1969 
OAU Convention requires states parties to observe the voluntariness principle, as a 
guiding principle in the repatriation process, which is integral to the human rights 
protection afforded to refugees. 
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CHAPTER 4 
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION: STATES’ PRACTICE 
4.1 BACKGROUND OF STATES’ PRACTICE 
Chapter two examines the legal framework dealing with refugee protection. It further 
explores states’ practice in applying the legal framework governing refugee 
protection i.e. voluntary repatriation, non-refoulement, and cessation. 
The previous chapters have demonstrated the different legislative frameworks which 
govern refugee protection as well as the voluntary repatriation at various different 
levels including international, regional, and domestic spheres. The actual protection 
of refugees or lack of protection thereof, however, can only be determined by the 
actual states’ practice or the correct implementation of the legislative framework. 
The voluntariness of repatriation is determined by analysing several states’ actions 
which include the declaration of the cessation clause which impacts largely on 
refugees, deportations, extraditions, and refoulement.  
The principle of non-refoulement which is essentially the axis of refugee protection, 
may possibly be breached by a number of actions, particularly these measures which 
are designed to prevent refugees from arriving at a specific country.457 It can also be 
breached by returning the refugees after arrival as well as actions which are intended 
to induce the refugees to repatriate in the guise of what is called voluntary 
repatriation.458 
The principle of non-refoulement, which prevents the return of refugees, seems to 
have developed considerably to the extent that it can be regarded as a customary 
international law.459 Notwithstanding the fact, several states have indicated their 
intentions to protect refugees and observe the principle of non-refoulement, this 
undertaking nonetheless, resulted in numerous breaches.460 
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The UNHCR has also observed that states’ failure to protect refugees is not as a 
result of the unavailability of the international refugee regime, but is a result of states’ 
breaching their obligations under international refugee regime.461 The refugee 
protection mechanisms governing voluntary repatriation, non-refoulement, and 
cessation have been dealt with by countries including Canada, South Africa, and the 
UK. These latter mentioned countries are parties to international refugee protection 
treaties, regional refugee protection treaties as well as human rights treaties which 
provide for the protection of human rights and refugees. 
4.2 SOUTH AFRICA 
4.2.1 BACKGROUND AND STATUTES  
Prior to the new democratic dispensation which followed the 1994 elections, South 
Africa was a refugee producing country.462. However, South Africa made every effort 
to prevent refugees from entering South Africa, especially from Mozambique. South 
Africa erected a 3000 volts electrified fence and razor wire fence at the border with 
Mozambique.463 The other part of the border which was not protected by the fence, 
constituted a part of the Kruger National Park which also barred Mozambican 
refugees from entering South Africa.464 This action constituted refoulement of 
refugees from Mozambique by South Africa.465 
The constitutional dispensation has made a fundamental policy shift regarding 
refugees. South Africa became party to the main international refugee instruments. 
Consequently, refugees are protected under South African law.  466 Since the advent 
of the democratic republic, South Africa has since engaged in two voluntary 
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repatriations of refugees from Mozambique and Angola with the assistance of the 
UNHCR. South Africa, through its state practice, has demonstrated how it deals with 
issues concerning non-refoulement and the cessation of refugee status, which are 
the cornerstone of refugee protection.  
4.2.2 NON-REFOULEMENT AND THE EXCEPTION 
Non-refoulement, which prevents countries from returning refugees to a country 
where they may face persecution, remains the core refugee protection principle. 
Upon the establishment of its presence in South Africa in 1991, the UNHCR criticised 
the South African Government’s violation of the principle of non-refoulement when it 
prevented Mozambican refugees into its territory.467 
During the period  of civil war in Mozambique which ultimately resulted in generating 
Mozambican refugees, South Africa was not party to either the 1951 UN Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol nor to the 1969 OAU Convention.468 In 1993 the UNHCR and 
the South African Government signed the Basic Agreement in order to afford asylum 
seekers and refugees international protection in terms of refugee instruments.469 In 
the same year, South Africa signed a tripartite agreement with the UNHCR and the 
Mozambican Government for the voluntary repatriation of Mozambicans.470 Only a 
small percentage of Mozambican refugees participated in the voluntary repatriation 
which consequently rendered the voluntary repatriation a failure.471  
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The failure of the Mozambican repatriation was due to the fact that most 
Mozambicans were still traumatised by the effect of a prolonged civil war in their 
home country and subsequently, these refugees did not wish to return home.472 
Furthermore, the repatriation plan of the UNHCR did not offer other options to 
repatriation.473 Mozambican refugees were left with no option than to repatriate.474 
The majority of Mozambicans who did not participate in the voluntary repatriation 
were forcefully deported by the South African Government.475 
Another setback in 2005 occurred during the repatriation of refugees from Zimbabwe. 
The life in Zimbabwe was inflicted by torture, intimidation, rape, killings, harassment 
and violent attacks at the hands of the Government which affected millions of people 
who then fled to South Africa.476 These violations of human rights were committed 
during what was called “Operation Murambatsvina,” which means, “Operation Clean 
Filth”.477  
When the Zimbabweans sought sanctuary in South Africa, South Africa returned 
thousands of Zimbabweans at the Musina border without giving them an opportunity 
to apply for asylum.478 The Zimbabweans were deported back to Zimbabwe by the 
South African Government, despite the human rights abuses which caused the flight 
of refugees, in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.479  
South Africa was not convinced that the refugees’ lives would be in danger if returned 
to Zimbabwe, notwithstanding the human rights abuses in Zimbabwe.480 The South 
African Government’s stance was that the situation in Zimbabwe does not warrant 
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granting asylum.481 The UNHCR also observed that the majority of the Zimbabweans 
are not refugees, however, the UNHCR emphasised that those Zimbabweans who 
are refugees should be protected against refoulement. 
The situation of refugees from Zimbabwe in South Africa was not according to the 
required measures by the law. This is possibly due to the huge number of refugees 
from that country. In this regard, the Minister of Home Affairs cited that the 
Government is overwhelmed by the sudden flow of refugees hence, the refoulement 
and non-issuing of asylum seeker permits.482 In the Zimbabwe Exile Forum case, an 
application was made to the High Court to prevent South Africa from arresting, 
detaining and deporting Zimbabweans who were protesting at the Chinese Embassy 
in Pretoria.483  
The application was based on, that the arrested Zimbabweans be released from 
detention and be granted temporary asylum seeker permits.484 Furthermore, that they 
were not issued with asylum seeker permits after applying for asylum and that they 
are entitled to be released from the LRF pending the appeal process.485 Despite the 
argument of the Minister of Home Affairs, the Court held that the failure to issue 
asylum seeker permits after detainees applied for asylum, as well as detention 
pending the appeal processes, is in conflict with both the Refugee Act and the 
Constitution.486  
The weakness in the application of refugee legislation in South Africa led to refugees 
being refouled which is in fact, contrary to South Africa’s international obligation not 
to refoule refugees.487 The Immigration Officers’ lack of understanding refugee 
legislations led to the inconsistent interpretation and application of the legal 
framework governing refugees, which has exacerbated the situation of the 
refugees.488 
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Another weakness in the practical application of refugee legislation in South Africa is 
due to the fact that the protection of refugees is entrusted upon border guards or 
detention center officers.489 Consequently, these officials are ineffective and 
unsuccessful in executing South Africa’s international obligation towards refugee 
protection.490 
There are a number of case law examples which indicate that South Africa refoule 
refugees in contravention of the international principles of non-refoulement. For 
example, the practice of detention at the LRF pending deportation to the country of 
origin is in contravention of the international refugee protection.  
In the case of Abdi v Minister of Home Affairs,491 the appellants sought an order to 
interdict the South African Government from deporting them to Somalia where they 
feared persecution.492 This was subsequent to their leaving South Africa to Namibia 
during the xenophobic attacks.493 In Namibia, they were arrested and were to be 
deported to Somalia via South Africa.494 While at the OR Tambo International Airport, 
they petitioned the Court to interdict their deportation.495 The first appellant was the 
registered asylum seeker and the second appellant a recognised refugee in South 
Africa.496 
The South Gauteng High Court held that deportation was not done by South Africa. 
The deportation was done by the Namibian Government since the appellants were 
arrested in Namibia after they left South Africa without notifying the authorities 
because they feared xenophobia.497   
The appellants then appealed against the decision of the South Gauteng High Court 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal and the appeal was upheld and the respondents 
were ordered to release the appellants from custody at the OR Tambo International 
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Airport.498 The second appellant was to remain in South Africa in accordance with his 
status as a refugee, and the first appellant was to remain in South Africa pending the 
asylum application and therefore exhausting all the appeal procedures.499 The 
Appeal Court held that passengers of international flights who land in South Africa 
can have recourse to South African courts.500 The Court held that to hold differently 
would be inconsistent with South Africa’s international obligation.501 
In certain circumstances, such as extradition to a country where a fugitive may face 
the death sentence, such extradition can amount to refoulement. A case in point is 
that of Mohamed. In the Mohamed case, the Constitutional Court held that, to 
extradite the person under the circumstances such as where one may be sentenced 
to death, is inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.502  
Mohamed was a Tanzanian national who was arrested in South Africa in connection 
with the terrorist attack on the US embassy in Dar es Salaam and was extradited to 
the USA and stood trial in the Federal Court in New York for murder charges.503  
The appellant’s contentions were that his extradition to the USA was in breach of the 
South African Constitution in that it infringed upon his right to life, dignity and not to 
be subjected to inhuman, degrading and cruel punishment.504 This was due to the 
fact that there was a possibility that if convicted, Mohamed might be sentenced to 
death and South Africa failed to seek assurance that death will not be imposed 
should Mohamed be found guilty.505 
The Court held that South Africa infringed Mohamed’s rights in terms of section 10, 
11 and 12(1)(d) of the Constitution, that is, the right to human dignity, to life and not 
to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.506 The Court’s ruling 
in the Mohamed case is in line with the Constitutional Court’s ruling in the 
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Makwanyane case where it was held that everyone has a right to human dignity, to 
life and not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.507 It is 
the commitment of South Africa under international law particularly, article 3 of the 
ECHR and article 3 of the CAT, not to send someone to a country where he might 
suffer degrading punishment.508 
In support of its ruling, the Constitutional Court also made reference to the ECtHR in 
the Soering case and the Chahal case where the Court held that the state which 
knowingly extradites a person to another state where such a person may be tortured, 
acts in contravention of article 3.1 of the CAT, as well as article 3 of the ECHR, 
irrespective of the prohibited conduct of such a person.509 The Court further held that 
the South African Government should have sought assurance from the USA 
Government that the death sentence would not be imposed if Mohamed was to be 
convicted.510 
4.2.3 CESSATION AND THE EXCEPTION 
The determination of cessation of refugee status in South Africa encompasses the 
international, regional and domestic instruments which include the 1951 UN 
Convention, the UNHCR Statute, the 1969 OAU Convention, and the Refugee Act of 
1998.511 
The Refugee Act is the principal legislation which deals with the issue of cessation in 
South Africa. Its provision on cessation closely resembles that of the 1951 UN 
Convention.512 The procedural aspect of cessation is dealt with in terms of the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice (PAJA) Act 3 of 2000 which ensures that 
everyone has a right to fair, lawful and reasonable administrative action.513 PAJA 
ensures that refugees are to be given reasons for the rejection of asylum applications 
and refugees’ status. Furthermore, PAJA gives refugees the right to have recourse to 
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the Appeal Board to challenge e.g. the decision of the Home Affairs Determination 
Officer.514 
The South African refugee legislation framework offers the widest protection possible 
because it encompasses international refugee legislations as well as international 
human rights instruments.515 It is however, the application of these protection 
instruments which remains a challenging aspect within South Africa’s jurisdiction.516 
Following the unsuccessful implementation of voluntary repatriation by South Africa 
and the UNHCR was the declaration of the cessation of refugee status for 
Mozambicans in 1996. In addition to the Mozambican repatriation experience, South 
Africa hosted refugees from Angola and engaged in a repatriation process of those 
Angolans. South Africa, Angola and the UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement on 14 
September 2003, for the “voluntary repatriation of Angolan” refugees.517 The tripartite 
agreement followed the end of hostilities caused by the civil war in Angola.518 
The UNHCR announced that the Angolan refugees’ status will cease from 30 June 
2012 which was later extended to 31 August 2013.519 Many Angolans were still 
reluctant to voluntarily repatriate to Angola despite the deadline for the cessation of 
refugee status.520 
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The highlight of this cessation was e.g. in the Mayongo case where the applicant was 
an Angolan national and his father was killed by the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) after he changed his political alliance from UNITA 
to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and Mayongo and his 
uncle were forced to consume the remains of his father by members of UNITA.521 
Mayongo was also tipped that he was going to be killed by UNITA members because 
he was suspected of collaborating with rebels.  
The appellant argued that although the war is over in Angola, he still fears for his life 
as people may retaliate for the actions of his late father in Angola.522 The appellant 
also receives medical treatment in South Africa. The medical evidence indicates that 
his condition would deteriorate should he be repatriated to Angola.523 
The Refugee Status Determination Officer (RSDO) refused to grant the applicant a 
refugee status which subsequently, led to the fact that the appellant approached the 
Refugee Appeal Board (RAB) which correspondingly, dismissed his application, 
resulting in the appellant’s appeal to the Transvaal Provincial Division.524 
The appeal was upheld and the applicant was recognised as a refugee in terms of 
section 3 of the Refugee Act 130 of 1998, and was granted asylum in terms of 
section 24(3)(a) of the Refugee Act of 1998 because there were compelling reasons 
arising out of previous persecution. The Court held that the RAB emphasised on the 
cessation clause in terms of section 5(1)(e) of the Refugee Act, and did not consider 
as to whether compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution in terms of 
section 5(2) of the Refugee Act applies to the accused.525 
The circumstances of the past persecution, supported by medical and psychological 
evidence, indicated that the applicant’s past persecution indeed amounted to 
sufficient compelling reasons.526 There is furthermore, no indication that the applicant 
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at all would still receive a similar standard of treatment for his depression should he 
be returned to Angola.527 
In almost comparable circumstances to that of Mayongo, in the Van Garderen case, 
the RSDO rejected the asylum seeker’s application on the grounds that there is a 
change in the circumstances in the Democratic Republic of Congo.528 Furthermore, 
that the war was over and that there was a transitional government and a prospect of 
a democratically elected government.529  
The RSDO held that the fear no longer exists that the appellant’s life will be in danger 
and rejected the claim on reasons based, not well-founded.530  The appellants 
appealed the decision to the RAB which confirmed the decision of the RSDO. 
However, on appeal to the High Court, the High Court held that the RAB has made 
an error in requiring high standards of proof from the applicants to prove the belief of 
a well-founded fear of persecution.531 The High Court furthermore, held that there 
was existing evidence of unrest and rape of women in the DRC as a result of 
integration of rival forces.532 The court further held that there is no evidence which 
confirmed that the circumstances which call for cessation has been met.533 
The actions of the South African Government demonstrate that despite its 
undertaking to observe the principle of non-refoulement, South Africa still acts in 
contravention of its international obligation. The challenges of implementing the 
international refugee protection instruments are not only limited to South Africa. First 
world countries such as the UK which played a leading  role in the South African 
legal development; it can be said that even such countries are similarly affected in its 
efficacy of implementing these international refugee protection instruments correctly. 
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4.3 UNITED KINGDOM 
4.3.1 BACKGROUND AND STATUTES  
The UK has influenced countries in the common law jurisdiction such as South Africa 
and Canada with regards to legal development.534 The UK has, however, recently 
experienced tension between managing the protection of refugees simultaneously 
with maintaining its territorial integrity by determining whom to admit within its 
territory.535 
The UK has ratified the 1951 UN Convention in 1954 and acceded to the 1967 
Protocol in 1968.536 The UK follows a dualist legal system.537 This has the implication 
that international treaties must be incorporated within the domestic sphere to have a 
binding effect on the UK.538 The UK has signed the ECHR in 1951 and strengthened 
the principle of non-refoulement beyond the one provided by article 33 of the 1951 
UN Convention.539 Consequently, the people who are subject to refoulement under 
the 1951 UN Convention, are still entitled to the protection on human rights grounds 
under article 3 of the ECHR.540 
In order to make the provisions of the ECHR binding within the UK, the UK has 
incorporated the provisions of the ECHR into the HRA which became operational in 
2000.541 Based on the nature of human rights protection, the ECHR, HRA and the 
1951 UN Convention operate alongside one another.542 
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The 1951 UN Convention and its Protocol has not been “expressly incorporated” in 
the UK municipal laws, however, the content of the legislations and rules which are 
implemented in asylum and immigration laws has led the courts to conclude that the 
1951 UN Convention has become part of the UK asylum and immigration laws.543 
Rule 16 of the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules provides that the UK 
should act in a manner consistent with the provisions of the “1951 UN Convention, 
and its 1967 Protocol when dealing with refugees.544 
Notwithstanding, the fact that the ECHR is particularly not concerned with asylum, it 
does however strengthen the principle of non-refoulement and provides for protection 
beyond that provided by the 1951 UN Convention.545  
4.3.2 NON-REFOULEMENT AND THE EXCEPTION 
The concept of voluntary repatriation of refugees has always revolved around non-
refoulement and the cessation of status. Breaching the non-refoulement principle, 
can occur in different ways including deportation and extradition. With the exception 
of the refugee regime the non-refoulement is also governed by the international 
human rights regime which covers everyone including refugees. 
The practice of the UK regarding refugees raises serious concerns. Although, the UK 
is a party to international law treaties which bar refoulement, the UK has 
transgressed the principle of non-refoulement on numerous occasions. In the Soering 
case, the UK detained Soering pending extradition to the USA while there was a risk 
that Soering would be subjected to the death penalty upon being extradited to the 
USA.546   
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The matter was taken on appeal to the ECtHR where the Court held that to extradite 
Soering would also be in violation of article 3 of the ECHR.547 This decision was 
taken, notwithstanding the assurance by the USA prosecutor that Soering would not 
be subjected to the death penalty if convicted, due to the fact, that the assurance by 
the USA was not absolute.548 The Court held that the UK has the responsibility to 
protect a person in terms of section 3 of the ECHR even if the UK is not the 
perpetrator because the right in terms of section 3 of the ECHR is absolute.549   
The UK’s Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Act provides for an exception to non-
refoulement in section 55 based on reasons that article 1.F of 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention is applicable or based on national security concerns.550  
The issue of national security interest in the UK came before the ECtHR in the 
Chahal case. Mr Chahal was detained pending deportation because it was alleged 
that his presence in the UK was “unconducive to public good by reason of national 
security.”551 Mr Chahal applied for asylum because of the fact, that he feared 
persecution should he be deported to India.552 His application for asylum was 
rejected. 
The ECtHR held that although article 33.2 of 1951 UN Convention authorises the 
state to expel a refugee if he poses a risk to the security of the country, and the Court 
held furthermore, that it would be wrong to expel a refugee back to the country where 
his life would be in danger.553  
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The Court additionally held that the security concerns of the host country cannot 
override the principle of non-refoulement.554 It further held that since article 3 of the 
ECHR absolutely prohibits torture, inhuman, and degrading treatment by state 
parties, the principle of non-refoulement must also be absolute.555  
The UK is highly critical of the majority decision in the Chahal case.556 In 2008, the 
UK has since tried to get the Chahal case overturned by arguing in the case of Saadi 
v Italy,557that the state should be allowed to balance the national security interest 
against that of the refugee, after the UK joined the hearing as a third party.558 
However, the decision of Chahal was confirmed by the ECtHR in the 2008 Saadi 
case.559  
The Saadi case confirmed once more that non-refoulement to torture is absolute and 
cannot be derogated under any circumstances.560 The UK’s argument that the 
ECtHR should endorse the “balancing act” principle was rejected.561 
In April 2009, the UK detained ten men from Pakistan on suspicion of terrorism.562 
Because of lack of sufficient evidence these men could not be tried.563 The UK opted 
to deport these men based on the fact that they constituted a threat to national 
security of the UK.564  
Abid Naseer, an alleged ringleader opposed the deportation on the grounds that he 
would face the risk of torture and inhuman treatment in Pakistan.565 The Special 
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Immigration Appeals Commission ruled in favour of Naseer but later, after evaluating 
the intelligence report, ruled against Naseer, that his presence in the UK indeed 
constituted a national security risk.566 This is an indication that notwithstanding the 
examples of the Chahal and Saadi cases, the UK still acts in contravention of the 
principle of non-refoulement to torture.  
In the Rehman case, the Court held that the UK cannot protect people who are a 
threat or a security risk of another country in fear of contravening article 33.567 
Rehman was a Pakistani national who was a legal resident in the UK.568 The UK 
made an order to deport him based on the fact that he was a danger to national 
security, and Rehman then appealed against this decision.  His appeal was 
dismissed.569 In his judgment, Lord Hoffmann stressed “the need for international co-
operation against terrorism as a legitimate point of view”.570 
The UK has also extended its control beyond its territory.571 The British Royal Navy 
has intercepted people en route to the UK at the Mediterranean Sea. In so doing, the 
UK acted contrary to its international obligation against refoulement.572 Furthermore, 
the UK has also deployed its immigration officials in foreign countries in order to 
identify people wishing to seek asylum in the UK. In this manner, the UK denied 
those people the opportunity to reach the UK for the purpose of seeking asylum.573 
Consequently,   the nature of the function of the immigration officials is preemptive 
which is intended to oversee the validity of travel documents, regardless the 
requirements intended for the protection the refugees.574  
During the middle of 2001, the UK has also sent its immigration officials to the 
Prague Airport in the Czeck Republic to “pre-clear” passengers and intercepts those 
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who intended to travel to the UK to apply for asylum.575 The activities of the UK 
immigration officers, who identified and intercepted people who wished to travel to 
the UK and seek asylum, was put to test in the European Roma Rights Center.576  
The European Roma Rights Center is the NGO which deals with the protection of the 
rights of the Romani people in Europe.577  
The European Roma Rights Center appealed the decision of the UK Court which 
ruled that “pre-clearance” does not constitute refoulement. The central question was 
whether the actions of the UK to “pre-clear” asylum seekers of Roma origin at the 
Prague Airport in the Czeck Republic, contravened the UK’s international obligation 
in terms of the 1951 UN Convention or customary international law.578 
The Court of Appeal held that the UK did not breach its international obligation for 
refugee protection in terms of article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention.579 It held that 
refugees as referred to in the article, in fact, refers to refugees who are outside their 
country of origin, and did not refer to someone who is still inside his or her own 
country.580 In other words, the “pre-clearance” at the Prague Airport was not 
considered a refoulement because those nationals were still in their own country and 
were never refouled or returned to any country.581 
In his dissenting opinion Lord Justice Laws held that the “pre-clearance” at the 
Prague Airport is contrary to the UK’s obligation under international law, and 
evidently more accentuated in the Roma nationals because they are treated less 
favourably compared to non-Roma nationals.582  
Wouters observes, that article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention does not provide for the 
geographical limitation as a qualification for refoulement, and that these words, “in 
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any manner whatsoever,” are an indication that it was not the intention of the drafters 
to exclude those who are still in their national territories.583 
The finding of the majority in the Court of Appeal was however, overturned by the 
House of Lords in the 2004 Roma Rights Center case.584 In paragraph 36 of the 2004 
Roma Rights Center case, Lord Steyn articulated as follows: 
“Following the principles affirmed by the House of Lords in [Nagarajan 
v London]  Regional Transport [2000] 1 AC 501, there is in law a 
single issue: why did the immigration  officers treat Roma less 
favourably than non-Roma? In  my view the only realistic answer  is 
that they did so because the persons concerned were Roma. They 
discriminated on  the ground of race. The motive for such 
discrimination is irrelevant: [Nagarajan v London Regional]…”585 
Although the House of Lords did not find for the appellant in terms of the issue of 
asylum, the House instead found for the appellant in respect of discrimination against 
the Roma nationals.586 
Lord Steyn held that since the UK has ratified the International Convention587 against 
racial discrimination; the UK has therefore breached its international obligations when 
it discriminated against Roma nationals at the Prague Airport.588 Lord Steyn further 
held, that since the UK has ratified the ICCPR, which prohibition of discrimination on 
several grounds including race; the UK has as a result breached its international 
obligations at the Prague Airport.589 
In the same vein, the UK breached the provision of article 33 of the 1951 UN 
Convention, when it removed the refugee claimant from Zimbabwean members of 
the opposition party, against the advice of its own Foreign Office which advised of the 
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risk such return possess.590 Moreover, the Human Rights Watch observed in 2012, 
that failed asylum seekers who have genuine asylum claims were deported from the 
UK to Tamil where they were arrested, detained, and tortured.591  
In another effort to prevent refugees from entering the UK and seek asylum, the UK 
and France built a double fence in 2002 to close the gap utilised by refugees to enter 
the UK.592 This resulted in refugees being rejected or refouled.593 
4.3.3 CESSATION AND THE EXCEPTION 
Refugee status is not a permanent solution to the plight of refugees. It comes to an 
end when certain requirements are met and the host country may invoke the 
cessation of status.594 In the UK, the cessation of refugee status is regulated by the 
Immigration Rules.595 The Immigration Rules provide more or less similar provisions 
of the cessation of refugee status to article 1.C.5 of the 1951 UN Convention.596 
Paragraph 339A of the Immigration Rules provides for cessation through voluntary 
action by the refugee, as well as the state invoking cessation of status due to the 
change of conditions in the country of origin. The Immigration Rules, however, do not 
provide for “compelling reasons” as an exception arising out of previous 
persecution.597 
The cessation of the status of refugees in the UK is better illustrated by the Hoxha 
case. Hoxha appealed against the Secretary of State because of the Home 
Department rejecting his application for asylum. Hoxha was a refugee when he left 
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his country and his asylum was accepted by the Home Department.598 The rejection 
of asylum was due to the change of circumstances in the country of origin and 
furthermore, that the country of origin was safe for return.599  
The contention of the appellants was based on the “compelling reasons arising out of 
previous persecution” due to the suffering they have endured at the hands of soldiers 
and the raping of Hoxha’s wife.600   
When it comes to the cessation of refugee status, the English Court of Appeal held 
that, “aspirations are to be distinguished from legal obligations.”601 The Court held 
that where the provision of the legislation is clear, the language of the text should be 
applied unless there is an overwhelming indication through state practice which 
supports deviation to the letter of the provision.602 The Court of Appeal held that the 
exception of cessation in terms of article 1.C.5 refers to a situation where a person 
has been “recognized” as a refugee.603 Further, that the appellants were not 
recognised as refugees, and for that reason, the exception to cessation is not 
applicable to them.604 
The Court held that the aspiration of the UNHCR should not be read into the 
provision of article 1.C.5.605 Added to that, had the international community wished to 
deviate from the provision of article 1.C.5, it should have been explicit within the 1967 
UN Protocol since the international community had an opportunity to do so.606 The 
appeal was therefore dismissed.607 
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4.4 CANADA 
4.4.1 BACKGROUND AND STATUTES  
Angela Delli Sante observes, that during 1981-1986, Canada has admitted a 
substantial number of refugees from Salvador and Guatemala, who fled persecution 
and civil unrest in their own countries.608 Canada also received a Nansen Award from 
the UNHCR for its sterling work in providing refuge for the persecuted.609 Canada is 
one of the countries which offer the resettlement of refugees.610 
Galloway observes, since then, that tension developed between Canada’s protection 
for refugees and refoulement as a subsequent result of criminal elements by 
refugees.611 This tension has since received attention in the enactment of the 2001 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and cases such as the Suresh and 
Ahani.612  
Canada has signed the 1951 UN Convention in 1969.613 Canada then incorporated 
the refugee definition as provided by the 1951 UN Convention into the 1976 
Immigration Act, as well as in section 2(1) of the IRPA as amended by Protecting 
Canada’s Immigration System Act (Bill C-31) of 2012.614 Canada ratified the ICCPR 
in 1976, as well as the CAT in 1987.615 The IRPA incorporates not only the 1951 UN 
Convention but its 1967 UN Protocol, the 1984 the CAT, as well as the ICCPR.616  
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The incorporation of these instruments into Canada’s domestic legislation has the 
implication that Canada cannot refoule refugees to face persecution.617 
The CAT provides that “torture cannot be justified by any exceptional 
circumstances”.618 Canada also incorporated within its domestic legislation, the 
ECHR in order to improve refugee protection.619 
Although Canada interprets the 1951 UN Convention restrictively, Canada applies a 
humanitarian approach to refugee protection, and also protects refugees who would 
otherwise not qualify as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention.620  
Regardless of Canada’s stance on refugee protection, Canada has at times infringed 
its international obligation towards refugee protection. This was evident in the Abdulle 
v Canada case where the Court held that although the applicant may stand to be 
persecuted in Somalia, so is every Somalian.621 The applicant will not be singled out 
for belonging to the Haba-Gedir sub-clan.622 
4.4.2 NON-REFOULEMENT AND THE EXCEPTION 
Non-refoulement is the core axis which determines the voluntariness of repatriation. 
One cannot address voluntary repatriation without addressing non-refoulement 
concomitantly. There are several case law examples which highlight Canada’s 
practice towards non-refoulement i.e. the Suresh v Canada, and the Németh v 
Canada cases. 
In Canada, the principle of non-refoulement is provided by section 115(1) of the 
IRPA. The Suresh case is the first to appear before the Supreme Court of Canada 
with regards to international protection against refoulement to torture.623 
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Similarly to the approach by the UK courts, the Canadian courts held that national 
security interest is relevant in determining whether to refoule or not.624 When it 
comes to issues of national security, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the Suresh 
case conceded that the seriousness of the security threat to the state should be 
weighed against the interest of a refugee.625  
In the Suresh case, the court acknowledged that the deportation to torture is not 
permissible.626 It correspondingly acknowledged that the state’s interest should be 
balanced against the refugee’s interest as provided by the Canadian Charter.627 The 
court held that deportation may only be allowed in “exceptional circumstances.”628 
The Court held that in balancing relevant factors, i.e. section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, should be taken into consideration when there is 
still a likelihood that a person may be returned to a place where he may face 
torture..629  
The Suresh case decision, however, ignored the earlier ruling of the ECtHR in the 
Chahal case which  provided that non-refoulement to torture is absolute and cannot 
be derogated under any circumstances.630 
Wouters observes, however, that despite the global concern regarding terrorism, 
article 33.2 of the 1951 UN Convention, should be interpreted restrictively since it 
does not provide for the exception to non-refoulement due to national security of 
other countries.631 The Article 33.2 exception refers to situations where the national 
security risk of the host country is at stake. Wouters argues therefore, that the threat 
to national security must be posed by the refugee to the country of refuge.632 
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When it comes to the national security concern, the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the fact that an individual is a member of a certain organisation alone cannot be 
a basis for refouling such an individual.633 The return should be warranted after a fair 
determination that such an individual indeed, poses a risk to national security.634  
The exception to the principle of non-refoulement is provided for by section 115(2) of 
the IRPA. As regards the exception to the principle of non-refoulement, the Canadian 
Supreme Court found that refoulement as a result of national security concern may 
be considered, even if they are not directly linked with Canada.635 The Court further 
held that the threat to national security of another state affects the security of the 
Canadian state.636  
In 2010, in the case of Németh v Canada,637  in what seemed to be a positive 
development in recognition of human rights principles in interpreting the principle of 
non-refoulement, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to 
the Minister of Justice.638 The Supreme Court held that the Minister of Justice applied 
an incorrect legal principle and did not consider the relevance of Canada’s human 
rights obligations to non-refoulement.639 The Supreme Court held that extraditing a 
refugee to a place where he or she fled requires a careful analysis which should take 
into account the human rights treaty obligations of Canada.640 
The Németh case highlights the link between the 1951 UN Convention concerning 
non-refoulement, the human rights treaties, and Canada’s international obligation to 
refugee protection. The Nemeth case, however, did not comment on the relevance of 
the Suresh case as an exception to non-refoulement in terms of section 115(2) of the 
IRPA.641 This has the implication that although the Németh case highlighted the 
importance of the human rights treaty obligation by Canada, non-refoulement to 
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torture or inhuman and degrading treatment does not have an absolute application in 
Canada. 
Although article 3 of the CAT renders the principle of non-refoulement to torture 
absolute, the decision in the Suresh case has the consequence that non-refoulement 
to torture is not absolute in Canada.642 The HRC expressed its concerns on its 
concluding observations on Canada’s returning persons to torture. The HRC 
expressed that non-refoulement in terms of the ICCPR is absolute and that under no 
circumstances can one be returned to a place where he or she may face torture, 
cruel or degrading treatment, irrespective of what the person might have done.643  
Canada, similar to the UK, also infringed its international obligation against non-
refoulement by practicing what is called “pre-arrival screening”.644 Canada did this by 
deploying immigration officials to other countries to ensure that only people with 
legitimate documents travel to Canada.645 This was done specifically with regards to 
the Roma refugees by placing visa requirements when they need to enter Canada.646  
The challenge with “pre-arrival screening” was that people who were eligible for 
refugee status were denied the opportunity to enter Canada and apply for asylum 
due to the lack of proper documentation.647 Canada has been withdrawing and 
reinstating its visa requirements for Roma nationals during 1994-2007 to control the 
flow of asylum seekers into Canada.648 This signifies that Canada’s approach 
towards the Roma asylum seekers has been enforced to repel them.649 
In the period between 1996 and 2002, Canadian immigration officials intercepted 
over 40 000 people who had the intention to travel to Canada because they did not 
possess valid documentations.650 The number of asylum seekers in Canada has 
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declined significantly by 2011 due to strategies employed by Canada to ward off 
would be asylum seekers.651   
4.4.3 CESSATION AND THE EXCEPTION 
The cessation of status in terms of the refugee protection regime follows after the 
change of conditions in the country of origin. The host country is empowered to 
mandate repatriation. Although the state can mandate repatriation due to the change 
of conditions in the country of origin, mandated repatriation is not absolute. Certain 
exceptions such as “compelling reasons” arising out of previous persecution still have 
to be considered as illustrated in chapter three above.  
Canadian refugee laws also make provision for cessation of refugee status in a 
similar manner as the 1951 UN Convention, and empower the Minister to make a 
determination of cessation when there is no longer a protection need for a refugee.652 
Section 108(4) of the IRPA also provides for an exception to the cessation of refugee 
status “due to compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution.”653  
The issue of cessation of refugee status was dealt with in the case of Suleiman v 
Canada.654 In this case, the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) rejected 
Suleiman’s application for refugee status due to the cessation of refugee status, as a 
result of the change of conditions in the country of origin.655 The Board went on to 
rule that the exception to cessation as provided by section 108(4) of the IRPA is also 
not applicable.656 The Board also made reference to the leading Obstoj case and that 
Suleiman did not meet the standard test set in the Obstoj case which requires that 
the claimant must have suffered “appalling and atrocious treatment” to qualify for 
exception.657 
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In the Obstoj case, the Federal Court held that regard should be had to the 
humanitarian approach when interpreting the exception to the application of the 
cessation clause.658 Furthermore, that even if there is no fear for future persecution, 
this exception should be applied in situations where the extent of past persecution 
was so serious that to expect the person to go back to that country would be 
unreasonable.659 This was also confirmed in the Suleiman case.660  
On review, the Federal Court in the Suleiman case held that the issue of whether 
“compelling reasons” exist has to be decided on a case by case basis, considering all 
relevant circumstances and taking into account the “humanitarian grounds, unusual 
or exceptional circumstances.”661 The Court went further, and held that the Board 
failed to consider all relevant circumstances, including medical evidence and this is 
visible in the Court accepting that Mr Suleiman suffers post-traumatic stress but still 
rules that the standard set in the Obstoj case for the exception to apply was not 
met.662 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
Evidently, in all three jurisdictions namely Canada, South Africa and the UK are 
parties to international and regional refugee treaties, as well as international and 
regional human rights treaties which protect refugees and all persons within their 
jurisdiction. These treaties include the 1951 UN Convention and its 1967 Protocol, 
the CAT, the ICCPR, the ECHR, the 1969 OAU Convention, and the ACHPR, to 
mention but a few. 
All jurisdictions have in one way or another incorporated the provisions of the 
international and regional treaties within their domestic legislations. This has the 
implication that these treaties become binding on state members. It is also evident, 
that there is no distinct line between refugee and human rights protection. This is due 
to the fact that the refugees are more often than not a result of human rights 
violations. Consequently, refugee law and human rights law have become 
intertwined. 
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This furthermore, incorporates that all jurisdictions boost a legal system where the 
rule of law and separation of powers prevail. Their domestic legislations also provide 
administrative and legal processes wherein persons are able to challenge the actions 
and decisions of the executive through appeals. 
There is evidence to show that the international obligations of states to protect 
refugees and persons within their jurisdictions have been violated on numerous 
occasions. The increase in international terrorism has also influenced the states to 
interpret the provisions of the 1951 UN Convention restrictively, to exclude members 
which are perceived to be a national security risk and contrary to human rights 
treaties which protect everyone against torture, irrespective of the offence they might 
have committed. The absolute nature of refoulement to torture has been confirmed in 
cases of the ECtHR i.e. the Chahal, Suresh and Saadi cases. The South African 
Constitutional Court has also used the Chahal and Suresh cases in interpreting the 
absolute nature of refoulement to torture. 
International law recognises that refugee status is not a permanent solution. It has to 
come to an end at a certain stage and when certain requirements are met. There is 
also evidence of practice in all jurisdictions where states apply the cessation clause 
restrictively, resulting in the fact that humanitarian obligations with regards to specific 
cases of refugees are ignored. 
This chapter further reveals that the principle of non-refoulement and the cessation of 
refugee status are the core determinant of the voluntary nature of repatriation. 
Voluntary repatriation which does not take into account the principle of non-
refoulement and the cessation of refugee status, is indeed flawed and resulting in the 
contravention of the international refugee protection regime. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PURPOSE, SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The focus of this limited scope dissertation intended to examine to whether South 
Africa’s legal aspect for voluntary repatriation of refugees offers a reliable, adequate 
legal basis for voluntary repatriation compared to the international framework and 
practice. The research also investigates two other issues such as: 
• The application of the cessation clause by South Africa which is required to 
be balanced with the measures relating to the non-refoulement, which is the 
cornerstone for refugee protection.  
• The extradition or expulsion by South Africa of a person to face torture due to 
national security interest without first obtaining assurance that torture or death 
will not be imposed is in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement. 
Since there are no sufficient international instruments dealing directly with the 
principle of voluntary repatriation except for the UNHCR Statute and the 1969 OAU 
Convention, it became compulsory to explore various other instruments which 
strengthen the principle of non-refoulement. It is crucial to explore how human rights 
instruments complement the refugee instruments with regards to voluntariness of 
repatriation. 
The human rights instruments of relevance in this study are the UDHR, the ECHR, 
the ICCPR, and the CAT.  These instruments are analysed to explore whether they 
contain provisions which ideally, enhance the principle of voluntary repatriation.  
The practice of the South African government with regards to the voluntariness of its 
repatriation laws are analysed and contrasted to similar jurisdictions of i.e. Canada 
and the UK. 
5.2 SUMMARY 
The world has seen the development of refugee protection legislations which followed 
WW II. These developments include the conclusion of the 1951 UN Convention and 
its 1967 Protocol, as well as the 1969 OAU Convention. The UNHCR also emerged 
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as a supervisory body with regards to refugee protection. These conventions 
ultimately construct the legal basis for refugee protection. 
The 1951 UN Convention concentrated more on the European refugees within a 
specific time frame, thereby excluding refugees from Africa and elsewhere. This 
consequently, necessitated the establishment of the 1969 OAU Convention which 
focused specifically on challenges affecting African refugees. 
The human rights law has also developed parallel to the refugee regime. The main 
focus of the human rights law is to offer protection to people whose rights are 
violated worldwide. The instruments governing human rights protection include the 
UDHR, the ECHR, the ICCPR and the CAT. These conventions form the basis of 
human rights protection. 
More often than not, the refugee regime and human rights regime overlap. This is 
consequently, because both regimes have as its purpose the protection of humans 
whose rights are notwithstanding, somehow infringed. The majority of countries 
worldwide are party to these refugee conventions and human rights conventions. 
Canada, South Africa, and the UK are some of the countries who are parties to these 
conventions. 
In all jurisdictions in this study, there have been practices which infringe on the 
refugee protection regime through refoulement and the cessation of the status of the 
refugee. 
5.2.1 VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION 
Provision on voluntary repatriation is only provided for by the UNHCR Statute, as well 
as the 1969 OAU Convention. The 1951 UN Convention does not provide for 
voluntary repatriation of refugees. There are, however, provisions of the 1951 UN 
Convention which shape the principles of voluntary repatriation i.e. the principle of 
non-refoulement and the cessation of refugee status.  
The countries of concern in this research, that is, Canada, South Africa, and the UK 
share a common law heritage and are parties to the international refugee instruments 
as well as international human rights instruments. The provisions of the international 
refugee and human rights treaties have been incorporated within the domestic 
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legislation in all countries of concern. These treaties are hence, applicable in the 
domestic sphere of these countries. 
South Africa is party to both the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention. 
Canada and the UK are not parties to the 1969 OAU Convention which is the only 
legal treaty which provides for voluntary repatriation. South Africa also incorporated 
major provisions of these conventions into the Refugee Act. South Africa did not 
however incorporate the voluntary repatriation clause within its Refugee Act. 
Therefore, the international community as well as South Africa does not provide for 
an adequate legal framework which specifically deals with the voluntary repatriation 
of refugees.  
It is evident that in all jurisdictions, governments have engaged in acts which 
contravened the principle of voluntary repatriation. South Africa has taken part in two 
organised voluntary repatriations with the assistance of the UNHCR. This was done 
after the cessation of refugee status and by signing the contractual agreements in the 
form of a tripartite agreement including South Africa, Mozambique, and the UNHCR, 
and once more, South Africa, Angola, and the UNHCR. 
Except organised voluntary repatriations, Canada, South Africa and the UK have 
acted in contravention of the principle of voluntary repatriation on numerous 
occasions which were eventually challenged in the courts of law. These 
contraventions typically occur as soon as states implement the cessation of refugee 
status due to the change of conditions in the country of origin, or acting on the 
exclusion of refugee status due to a national security threat, as provided by the 1951 
UN Convention.  
There is also the lack of clarity by the UNHCR as to how these provisions of the 
UNHCR Statute in relation to the cessation clause is to be reconciled with its 
mandate to promote only voluntary repatriation. The issue arises: How do states 
ensure that repatriation is voluntary when it is done under the cessation of refugee 
status in terms of the 1951 UN Convention which does not require voluntariness by 
the refugee. 
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5.1.2 CESSATION 
It has been observed throughout this study that refugee status is not a permanent 
solution. It has to come to an end at a certain stage. This sentiment was echoed well 
by the first High Commissioner for Refugees, Van Heuven who stated that refugee 
status should “not be granted for a day longer than absolutely necessary, and should 
come to an end”.663 The course of action wherein the status of a refugee is 
terminated is through the invocation of the cessation clause. The cessation clause is 
provided by the 1951 UN Convention, the UNHCR Statute, as well as the 1969 OAU 
Convention.  
To this point, this study has revealed that in all three jurisdictions i.e. Canada, South 
Africa and the UK, the domestic legislations provided for the cessation of refugee 
status due to a change in conditions in the country of origin. In South Africa, section 5 
(e) of the Refugee Act provides for the cessation of refugee status due to a change in 
circumstances which caused the flight. Furthermore, section 5(2) of the Refugee Act 
provide for the exception to the cessation of refugee status, which is based on 
compelling reasons arising out of previous persecutions.  
The UK’s application of cessation as provided for by the 1951 UN Convention and 
the Immigration Rules is similar to the one provided in South Africa’s Refugee Act 
with the exception that the Immigration Rules do not provide for the compelling 
reason exception. Rule 339 (A) (v) and (vi) of the Immigration Rules provides for the 
cessation of refugee status due to changed circumstances although Rule 339 (C) (iii) 
provides exception due to substantial grounds for believing that he will face serious 
harm if returned.  
The difference between the exception clauses provided by the two jurisdictions 
above is that the exception clause provided by South African jurisdiction has a 
humanitarian element as it protects even refugees who do not fear future 
persecution. On the contrary, the UK only provides exception where there is a 
prospect of future persecution on the refugee and as a consequence, this has the 
implication that the refugee who still suffers the effects of past persecution might still 
be forced to return to his or her country of origin. 
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In Canada, the cessation of refugee status is provided for by section 108 (1) (e) of 
the IRPA, while the exception to cessation of refugee status is provided by section 
108(4) of the same Act. The provisions of Canadian cessation are similar to the 
South African cessation of refugee status in that Canada also protects refugees from 
returning due to the seriousness of their past persecution, even if there is no 
prospect of future persecution on the refugee. This also exhibits a humanitarian 
approach by Canadian jurisdiction. 
It has been further observed, that in three aforementioned jurisdictions; states 
mandate repatriation after the cessation of status and disregard the compelling 
reason exception. This was seen in the Mayongo case by South Africa, the Suleiman 
case in Canada and the Hoxha case in the UK.  
South Africa sought to repatriate Mayongo to Angola due to the fact that there was 
sufficient evidence of a change of circumstances in his country of origin, 
notwithstanding that he had compelling reasons arising out of his previous 
persecution. This was also despite the fact that the South African exception to the 
cessation of refugee status also provides for compelling reasons arising out of 
previous persecution. 
Canada applied the cessation clause in the Suleiman case due to changed 
circumstances in the country of origin but nonetheless, failed to consider the 
exception due to compelling reasons. The courts, however, interpreted the provisions 
of the cessation clause in favour of the refugees in that there were adequate 
compelling reasons in both cases not to invoke the ceased circumstances clause. 
The 1951 UN Convention as well as the 1969 OAU Convention provide for the 
cessation of refugee status on similar grounds. The difference is however, that unlike 
the 1951 UN Convention, the 1969 OAU Convention does not provide for exception 
to cessation due to “compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution”.664  
Notwithstanding the provision on cessation and its exception in terms of the Refugee 
Act, it is in the application of these provisions by South Africa which often creates 
uncertainties. In the Mayongo case, South Africa sought to deport him due to the fact 
that there were circumstantial evidence to impart that he was no longer as a person 
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with a refugee status. The reason was consequently due to the civil war which ended 
in Angola.  
The UK is not a party to the 1969 OAU Convention and is therefore not bound by the 
principle of voluntary repatriation as provided therein. The UK, as a party to the 1951 
UN Convention applies the cessation clause which does not require voluntariness by 
the refugee. The Hoxha case application of the cessation clause was to the effect 
that “aspirations are to be distinguished from legal obligations.”665 The court held that 
the UNHCR’s recommendation do not constitute legal obligations to states. Further, 
that where the language of the Statute is clear, deviation is not warranted unless 
there is substantial evidence to the contrary.  
Canada’s cessation of refugee status due to a change in the circumstances is 
provided by section 108 (1) (e) of the IRPA. The exception to cessation due to 
compelling reasons arising out of previous persecutions is provided by section 108 
(4) of the IRPA. In the Suleiman case the Court held that in order to ascertain 
whether exception in terms of section 108 (4) is applicable, all circumstances must 
be taken into account, and every case be assessed on its own merits. Furthermore, 
that the Court should consider humanitarian grounds as well as unusual 
circumstances.  
The Court further held that it is inconceivable that the IRB would find that Suleiman 
suffers from depression and post-traumatic anxiety, yet rule that his condition does 
not qualify protection under 108 (4) of the IRPA.  
5.1.3 NON-REFOULEMENT 
South Africa is party to several international instruments which entrench the principle 
of non-refoulement including the 1951 UN Convention, the 1969 OAU Convention, 
the ECHR, the ICCPR, and the CAT. Canada and the UK are also parties to the 
above international instruments except for the 1969 OAU Convention.  
The 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention are the major refugee 
protection instruments which provide for the principle of non-refoulement which South 
Africa has ratified. The provision on non-refoulement, however, is not without 
restrictions. The significance here is that these refugee conventions do not absolutely 
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guarantee the principle of non-refoulement. To the contrary, the provisions of non-
refoulement in terms of human rights instruments i.e. the ICCPR, the ECHR, and the 
CAT, are fundamentally absolute. 
The principle of non-refoulement can be inherently seen as the cornerstone of 
refugee protection. Whether the refugee, asylum seeker or an alien is returned, 
extradited, deported or expelled, the most relevant principle to be infringed is that of 
non-refoulement. Whether repatriation is voluntary or involuntary, the principle to be 
infringed upon is that of non-refoulement. The principle of non-refoulement can 
therefore be seen to have developed to the extent that it can be regarded as a 
customary international law.666 
It often occurs that conflict arises between the protection of human rights of an 
individual or refugee, and the national security or public interest. When such a matter 
arises the issue is which interest should be weighed heavier than the other? State 
practice of countries like Canada, South Africa, and the UK can be seen to ascend 
towards protecting the national interest at the expense of refugees evident in the 
Mohamed, Chahal and Suresh cases. 
In South Africa’s domestic sphere, the issue of non-refoulement to torture is covered 
by the right to human dignity entrenched in section 10 and the right not to be 
punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way as entrenched in section 11 of the 
Constitution. These sections also reflect the provision of article 3 of the ECHR, the 
CAT, the ICCPR and the ACHPR which South Africa is party to and which purport 
that no one shall be subject to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
In spite of the above provisions against non-refoulement, the South African 
Government extradited Mohamed to the USA to face charges wherein if he was 
convicted the death sentence was a potential verdict. This was against the South 
African Constitution as well as the international obligation of non-refoulement. 
The Constitutional Court in the Mohamed case confirmed the decision in the 
Makwanyane case that the death sentence constitutes torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. The Court went further and held that by sending Mohamed 
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to the USA to face the death sentence if convicted, South Africa infringed not only the 
Constitution but the ECHR, and the CAT which South Africa is party to.  
The decision of the Court indicates that South Africa as a signatory to conventions 
against non-refoulement has a duty not to act in such a way which might assist 
another state to infringe the rights of refugees. By extraditing Mohamed to the USA 
without seeking assurance that the death penalty would not be imposed, South Africa 
is somehow connected to the subsequent action and its consequences. This 
sentiment was echoed in the ECtHR in the Soering case where the Court held that 
the state which knowingly extradites a person to another state where such a person 
may be tortured, acts directly in contravention of article 3 of the CAT irrespective of 
the prohibited conduct of such a person.667  
The Supreme Court of Canada also held in the Suresh case that extraditing a person 
to the country where such a person might be sentenced to death infringes article 3 of 
the CAT. 
The judgment of the South African Constitutional Court, the ECtHR, as well as the 
Canadian Supreme Court shows that the content of non-refoulement to torture in 
terms of article 3 of the CAT is absolute. It is therefore concluded that Canada, South 
Africa, and the UK continues to infringe their international obligations under the 
principle of non-refoulement. 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
In deliberating the above observations, the underlying assumptions revolve around 
the absence of an adequate international legal framework. In other words, it is the 
lack of such a framework which was supposed to deal with the principle of voluntary 
repatriation. The UNHCR Statute as well as the 1969 OAU Convention make 
provision for voluntariness of repatriation but fail to provide clear cut guidelines on 
how to apply such provisions. Canada, South Africa, and the UK do not have 
domestic legislations which regulate the principle of voluntary repatriation of 
refugees. 
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South Africa’s lack of provision in its Refugee Act as well as its practice with regards 
to repatriation, therefore highlight that South Africa’s legislative framework do not 
offer a reliable, adequate legal basis for voluntary repatriation of refugees.  
Although the South African Refugee Act provides for the cessation clause and non-
refoulement compliant with international standards, it is in the actual practice where 
South Africa contravenes international human rights obligations. It can be concluded 
that the application of the cessation clause by South Africa impacts and indicates at 
the violation of the principle of non-refoulement, accordingly observed in the cases of 
Mayongo and Van Garderen. 
The South African approach in the Mayongo case is similar to the Canadian 
approach in the Suleiman case. In both these cases Canada and South Africa,   
applied the cessation clause due to changed circumstances in the country of origin 
but failed to consider the exception due to compelling reasons. The courts, however, 
interpreted the provisions of the cessation clause in favour of the refugees, in that 
there were compelling reasons in both cases not to invoke the ceased circumstances 
clause. One can therefore conclude, that the independence of the judiciary and the 
rule of law offer a valuable contribution to the development of refugee protection in 
both countries. 
Furthermore, it can therefore be concluded that the South African government uses 
the blanket approach in applying the cessation clause in terms of section 5(1) (e) of 
the Refugee Act without investigation circumstances of an individual case. One can 
also conclude that South Africa’s main goal once cessation is invoked is to repatriate. 
This is supported by the Mayongo case, and the question arises why South Africa 
accepted the seriousness of Mayongo’s past persecution and notwithstanding, still in 
the same vein sought to repatriate him. 
The South African Constitution as supported by the Constitutional Court judgments 
guarantees the right to life without exceptions. Provisions of the human rights 
conventions such as the ECHR, and the CAT which South Africa is party to, 
absolutely bar refoulement to torture, inhuman and degrading punishment.  
One can therefore conclude that when South Africa extradites or expels a person to 
face torture due to national security interest, without first obtaining assurance that the 
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death penalty will not be imposed is in contravention of the principle of non-
refoulement. 
In all three jurisdictions in this study practices occur which infringe the principle of 
non-refoulement. There is also reluctance by all states in the study to consider the 
absolute nature of non-refoulement, particularly when dealing with human rights 
issues such as non-refoulement to torture which also affect refugees. 
The influence of human rights treaties on the development of refugee protection has 
the implication that the refugee protection regime cannot be applied in isolation, that 
is without giving regard to human rights regime. The interaction between refugee 
regime and human rights law were also echoed in the South African Constitutional 
Court in the Mohamed case.668 One can therefore conclude that human rights as well 
as the refugee regime can be applied harmoniously in order to offer the best possible 
protection for refugees. 
It is also imperative that every state protects its national against acts of terrorism or 
threat to its security. It is also evident that the international communities have faced 
in some way or another acts of terror. This therefore influences states to be vigilant in 
their approach to non-nationals or refugees. 
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the South African Refugee Act has no provision on voluntary repatriation, 
South Africa as an African frontrunner in advancing human rights should propagate 
reformation that will seek to reconcile the provision on cessation and voluntary 
repatriation. South Africa should therefore amend the Refugee Act to insert a 
voluntary repatriation clause. South Africa should also create provisions intended to 
harmonise the principle of voluntary repatriation with mandatory repatriation as a 
result of cessation. 
The UNHCR should also develop guidelines which will clarify the relationship 
between voluntariness of repatriation and mandatory repatriation as a subsequent 
cessation of refugee status.  
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South Africa should interpret the human rights regime and the refugee regime 
simultaneously and not as separate regimes. These regimes should be interpreted 
holistically because these regimes offer protection to refugee and human rights 
concurrently. Consequently, South Africa should therefore implement refugee 
protection treaties in conjunction with human rights treaties in order to afford 
refugees the best protection possible. 
South Africa should provide adequate training to the staff members at the LRF to 
enable them to apply international acceptable standards for refugee protection. Non-
African states i.e. Canada and the UK should subsequently also be inspired by the 
1969 OAU Convention, which can be a crucial process in the way to expand on the 
principle of voluntary repatriation and also harmonise the provision of voluntary 
repatriation ensuing the cessation of refugee status. 
States must co-operate with one another and share the burden of hosting refugees to 
ease the pressure on other states in hosting refugees. South Africa should use its 
influence on the African continent as well as internationally to request assistance in 
hosting refugees. This will ease the burden on South Africa and prevent refoulement 
due to the pressure of hosting large numbers of refugees. This should be employed 
to improve tolerance by South African citizens towards foreign nationals, which will 
then prevent hostilities such as xenophobia. 
South Africa should therefore encourage member states of the 1969 OAU 
Convention to amend the Convention and insert a provision which provides for the 
exception due to compelling reasons as provided by its counterpart, the 1951 UN 
Convention. Consequently, member states not having incorporated the exception to 
cessation into their domestic legislations should be encouraged to do so. 
South Africa should also apply the exception to the cessation clause in good faith 
instead, and not to the contrary, refoule or deport refugees without first ensuring 
whether they qualify under the exception clause. South Africa ought to, at all times 
endeavor to deal with each case on its merits and refrain from the blanket approach 
to the refugees’ situations. 
States should find alternative approach to combat international terror without 
endangering those who are in need of protection, that is, refugees. The international 
community should co-operate with one another and offer protection to refugees other 
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than just paying lip service to the phenomenon of refugee protection. Voluntary 
repatriation should be applied as it is and not as a disguise for forced return. 
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